57
INTEGRATING
COMPETITION AND
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES
IN BRAZIL: PATHWAYS
TO FOSTER A DYNAMIC
DIGITAL ECONOMY
THROUGH ANTITRUST AND
INNOVATION
1
INTEGRANDO POLÍTICAS CONCORRENCIAIS
E INDUSTRIAIS NO BRASIL: CAMINHOS PARA
A PROMOÇÃO DE UMA ECONOMIA DIGITAL
DINÂMICA POR MEIO DO ANTITRUSTE E DA
INOVAÇÃO
Diogo Thomson de Andrade
2
Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade)
Paulo Henrique de Oliveira
3
Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV-EAESP)
STRUCTURED SUMMARY
Context: This article explores the intricate relationship between industrial and competition policies in
1 Editor responsável: Prof. Dr. Victor Oliveira Fernandes, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade), Brasília,
DF, Brasil. Lattes: http://lattes.cnpq.br/5250274768971874. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5431-4142.
Recebido em: 16/01/2025 Aceito em: 11/06/2025 Publicado em: 25/06/2025
2 Ph.D. in Law from the Brazilian Institute of Education, Development and Research (IDP). Holds a Master's degree in
Philosophy of Law from PUC-SP (2009) and a Bachelor's degree in Law from the same institution (2003). He has been a Federal
Attorney (member of the Federal Attorney General’s Oce) since 2004. Serves as a BoardMember at the Administrative Cou-
ncil for Economic Defense (Cade) since December 2023. Previously served as Deputy Superintendent of Cade (2012-2023) and
Interim General Superintendent (July 2021 to April 2022 and July to October 2017). He also held the position of Director of the
Department of Economic Protection and Defense (DPDE) at the now-defunct Secretariat of Economic Law of the Ministry of
Justice (2011-2012) and Federal Attorney, Head of the Studies and Opinions Division (Consultative) at Cade’s Specialized Federal
Attorney’s Oce (2007-2010).
E-mail: diogo.andrade@cade.gov.br Lattes: http://lattes.cnpq.br/1013455166196943 ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2850-
4150
3 Ph.D. Candidate and MSc in Politics and Economics of the Public Sector (Public Administration and Government) at
FGV-EAESP, with a B.A. in Economics from the Federal University of São Paulo (UNIFESP). He is a researcher at the Economic
Power and Democracy Crisis Research Group (GPED/NDD) at CEBRAP and at the Center for Law, Internet and Society (CEDIS).
Currently, he serves as Chief of Sta to Commissioner Diogo Thomson de Andrade at the Tribunal of the Administrative Council
for Economic Defense (Cade).
E-mail: oliveira.paulo@fgv.edu.br Lattes: http://lattes.cnpq.br/7317015365816360 ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0002-9976-
8695
3
58
ANDRADE, Diogo Thomson de; OLIVEIRA, Paulo Henrique de. Integrating competition and
industrial policies in Brazil: pathways to foster a dynamic digital economy through antitrust and
innovation. Revista de Defesa da Concorrência, Brasília, v. 13, n. 1, p. 57-72, 2025.
https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v13i1.1923
the digital economy, with a particular focus on Brazil. It examines the resurgence of industrial policy
approaches designed to promote innovation and competitiveness while addressing the evolving
role of competition policy in maintaining market neutrality. Highlighting the key role of Brazil’s
Administrative Council for Economic Defense (Cade), the study emphasizes how antitrust measures
intersect with regulatory governance and industrial initiatives in fostering a dynamic digital economy.
Objective: The main objective is to analyze the interaction between industrial and competition
policies in Brazil, highlighting their complementary and conflicting aspects. By exploring the country’s
regulatory framework and its implications for the digital economy, the article seeks to identify
strategies for achieving policy integration that supports innovation, competition, and contestability
in these markets.
Methodology: The study employs a literature review approach, subsequently analyzing emerging
trends in Brazil. It develops a research agenda focusing on the interplay between industrial and
competition policies, oering preliminary insights rather than definitive conclusions. The structure
includes a historical overview, an exploration of policy intersections, and an analysis of Brazil’s
regulatory practices and their economic impacts.
Conclusion: The article highlights the need for alignment between policies to address the challenges
of the digital economy, such as innovation bottlenecks, regulatory ineciencies, and market
concentration. By integrating these policies, Brazil can create a digital environment that is more
conducive to innovation and competitiveness. In this regard, the study highlights the development
of the Pix payment system, along with other initiatives, as an example of eective policy integration
that balances state-led actions with market dynamics. It also emphasizes the role of Cade in ensuring
conditions that foster innovation and competition throughout the economy.
Keywords: competition policy; industrial policy; digital platforms; market governance; innovation;
digital public infrastructures.
JEL: L40; L52; O31; O33; O52.
RESUMO ESTRUTURADO
Contexto: este artigo explora a intrincada relação entre políticas industriais e concorrenciais no
âmbito da economia digital, com foco particular no Brasil. Examina-se a ressurgência de abordagens
de política industrial voltadas para promover inovação e competitividade, ao mesmo tempo em
que se aborda o papel em evolução da política de competição na manutenção da neutralidade
de mercado. Destacando o papel-chave do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade),
o estudo enfatiza como medidas antitruste se cruzam com a governança regulatória e iniciativas
industriais na promoção de uma economia digital dinâmica.
Objetivo: o objetivo principal é analisar a interação entre políticas industriais e concorrenciais no
Brasil, destacando seus aspectos complementares e conflitantes. Ao explorar o arcabouço regulatório
do país e suas implicações para a economia digital, o artigo busca identificar estratégias para alcançar
uma integração política que apoie a inovação e a concorrência e contestabilidade nestes mercados.
Método: o estudo utiliza uma abordagem de revisão de literatura, analisando posteriormente
tendências emergentes no Brasil. Busca-se o desenvolvimento de uma agenda de pesquisa focada
59
na interação entre políticas industriais e concorrenciais, oferecendo insights preliminares em vez
de conclusões definitivas. A estrutura inclui uma revisitação da relação histórica entre as políticas,
uma exploração das interseções existentes e uma análise das práticas regulatórias do Brasil e seus
impactos econômicos.
Conclusões: o artigo destaca a necessidade de alinhamento entre as políticas para enfrentamento dos
desafios da economia digital, como gargalos de inovação, ineficiências regulatórias e concentração de
mercado. Ao integrar essas políticas, o Brasil pode criar um cenário digital mais propício à inovação
e competitivo. O estudo ressalta o desenvolvimento do sistema de pagamento Pix, além de outras
iniciativas, como um exemplo de integração política eficaz que equilibra ações lideradas pelo Estado
com dinâmicas de mercado, e enfatiza o papel do Cade em garantir condições para a promoção da
inovação e da concorrência em toda a economia.
Palavras-chave: política concorrencial; política industrial; plataformas digitais; governança de
mercado; inovação; infraestruturas públicas digitais.
Summary: 1. Introduction; 2. The new industrial policy
of the 21
st
century; 3. The interplay between industrial
policy and antitrust before and ater the digital age;
4. Governance, competition, and industrial policy in
Brazil: a brief analysis of Cade’s role at the intersection
of competition and industrial policies; 5. Conclusion;
References.
1 INTRODUCTION
The growing prominence of new theories on industrial policy in recent years underscores a
shit toward strategic government intervention aimed at promoting innovation, driving technological
progress, and strengthening economic resilience. This approach diers from traditional forms of
industrial policy, which oten relied on protectionism and direct state intervention. Instead, modern
industrial policy seeks to shape the economic environment to facilitate innovation, sustainability, and
competitiveness. As noted by Evenett et al. (2024), “strategic competitiveness is the dominant motive
governments give for taking action, followed by climate change and supply chain resilience, with
geopolitical and national security concerns accounting for a smaller share”. This broader approach
reflects an expanded rationale for industrial policy beyond the traditional focus on correcting market
failures or fostering innovation alone. Instead, modern industrial policy seeks to shape the economic
environment to foster resilience, sustainability, and competitiveness in response to the complex
demands of the 21st century.
In tandem with this resurgence, the role of competition policy has also evolved. Traditionally
focused on solely ensuring market eciency and preventing monopolistic practices, competition
policy now assumes a central role in being a priori embedded in the design of industrial policies.
This integration is essential to ensure that the pursuit of strategic objectives – such as technological
leadership and sustainability – does not come at the cost of market contestability. This function is
particularly critical in the context of digital markets, where platform dominance pose unique challenges
60
ANDRADE, Diogo Thomson de; OLIVEIRA, Paulo Henrique de. Integrating competition and
industrial policies in Brazil: pathways to foster a dynamic digital economy through antitrust and
innovation. Revista de Defesa da Concorrência, Brasília, v. 13, n. 1, p. 57-72, 2025.
https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v13i1.1923
to maintaining open and competitive environments. However, tensions persist between these two
policy areas, as the pursuit of industrial development – whether for innovation, sustainability,
security, or competitiveness – can sometimes conflict with competition goals, particularly when state
intervention is involved. In this regard, one of the key challenges lies in finding a balance that promotes
technological growth without compromising competitive neutrality. Accordingly, the digital economy
presents new challenges for both industrial and competition policies. The market power of digital
platforms, their network eects, and data control issues have blurred the lines between the need
for regulation and the need to promote innovation. This is particularly relevant in Brazil, where the
government has recently undertaken multiple initiatives aimed at regulatory governance, competition
enforcement – even advancing toward a direct debate regarding the role of antitrust enforcement in
digital aairs
4
–, and industrial policy in the digital sector. In this context, the Administrative Council
for Economic Defense (Cade) has emerged as a key actor. Cade’s role spans across these fronts,
balancing antitrust enforcement, contributing to regulatory governance, and supporting industrial
initiatives aimed at improving Brazil’s position in the global digital economy.
Methodologically, this study employs a literature review, subsequently analyzing emerging
trends in the Brazilian context aiming to open a research agenda focused on the interface – both positive
and negative – between industrial and competition policies. Its purpose is not to deliver conclusive
findings but to provide preliminary insights into the interplay between these two policy domains,
guiding potential avenues for further investigation, with a special focus on the digital economy.
The structure of the article is as follows. The first section provides an overview of the new
industrial policies in the 21st century, exploring their evolution and current dynamics. The second
section delves into the interface between industrial policy and competition policy, examining
their relationship before and ater the digital age. This includes an analysis of the tensions and
complementarities that arise when these two policy domains intersect. The third section presents
a preliminary look at the Brazilian case, highlighting the role of various government entities, mainly
Cade, in shaping a dynamic digital economy through regulatory, competitive, and industrial policies.
Finally, we summarize the findings and discuss key policy recommendations to improve the integration
of competition and industrial policies in Brazil.
2 THE NEW INDUSTRIAL POLICY OF THE 21ST CENTURY
The resurgence of industrial policy in the 21st century has redefined its role as a crucial
instrument for economic growth, technological development, and national resilience. In short,
industrial policies can be defined as government initiatives that explicitly target the transformation
of economic activity to achieve public goals such as stimulating innovation, productivity, climate
transition, and economic growth (Juhász; Lane; Rodrik, 2024). These policies, in turn, aim to shape
the economic structure by exercising discretion in favoring certain sectors (or economic behaviors/
outcomes) over others.
4 For more information, refer to the working paper prepared by the Ministry of Finance based on input gathered re-
garding competition issues in digital markets (Ministério […], 2024).
61
As Juhász, Lane and Rodrik (2024) notes, traditionally, critiques point out that industrial policies
were characterized by protectionism and direct state intervention to support national industries.
These arguments oten focus on informational shortcomings and political capture. Regarding the first,
governments may lack sucient knowledge about market failures to make eective decisions, while
the latter suggests that industrial policy can be susceptible to lobbying and influence, leading to
decisions that benefit private interests without enhancing overall social welfare (Juhász; Lane; Rodrik,
2024). Another point of contention is that the resurgence of industrial policy is closely linked to a more
protectionist and nationalist global environment. This shit has prompted concerns that industrial
policy might be used to prioritize national interests at the expense of international cooperation
5
.
Although these arguments are valid in many respects and should be background concerns
in any context of industrial policy formulation/implementation, economic theory has increasingly
made room for the use of new industrial policy strategies, focusing on well-designed and evidence-
based policies to foster competitiveness, innovation, and broader welfare gains. Unlike traditional
protectionist approaches – oten focused on developing foundational industries, such as durable
and non-durable goods sectors, to mitigate competitive disadvantages – these new industrial policy
frameworks emphasize creating an environment conducive to innovation, technological sovereignty,
and sustainability. This shit is driven by challenges in the digital economy, geopolitical uncertainties,
and the need to address climate change, among other vectors.
In this regard, new industrial policies must balance state intervention with market dynamics,
leveraging government support to stimulate innovation in the private sector (Rodrik, 2004; Aiginger;
Rodrik, 2020; Juhász; Lane; Rodrik, 2024). Delving deeper into this concept, Mazzucato and Rodrik
(2023) argue that industrial policies should be accompanied by conditionalities, tying government
support to objectives that maximize public value, such as fostering local innovation ecosystems and
ensuring fair competition.
The recent “Draghi Report” emphasizes that industrial policy should focus not on picking
winners, but on fostering an environment where innovation can flourish across all sectors. Rather than
direct intervention, this approach focuses on aligning incentives to foster private sector growth in key
areas. Investments in digital infrastructure, green technologies, and skills development are crucial
to maintaining competitiveness in a rapidly changing global landscape. By shaping markets through
strategic investments and partnerships, this policy model seeks to develop markets that encourage
technological advancement and sustainability
6
. The report highlights the need to align industrial
policy with broader social goals, such as reducing inequalities and promoting sustainability, ultimately
building market structures that support innovation without heavy-handed intervention (Draghi, 2024).
5 As highlighted by Evenett et al. (2024), the recent wave of industrial policy measures has been largely driven by ad-
vanced economies and is frequently motivated by strategic competitiveness, climate objectives, and national security. These
trends have led to a notable increase in tit-for-tat dynamics: “a subsidy for a given product by one major economy is met
with a subsidy for the same product by another within one year” in nearly 74 percent of cases. Such dynamics raise important
questions about the sustainability of the multilateral trading system and point to the urgent need for greater transparency,
dialogue, and coordination in the governance of industrial policies.
6 Perspectives like this regarding the role of the state in the process of structuring markets and incentives align with
the perspective of a state-market interaction role that goes beyond the regulatory paradigm, advancing towards understanding
the state as an agent of “marketcrat”, “marketcreating” or “marketshaping.” In this context, it is assumed that for this set of
policies, and consequently for the development of this state role, greater interaction (and oten complementarity) between
various spheres of public policy is required, whether related to inclusion, sustainability, foreign trade, competition, regulation,
or industrial policy actions. These assumptions imply viewing market governance as a way to rebalance power and as a form
of distributive policy. For further debates on this model of action, see: Mazzucato (2016) and Vogel (2018, 2023).
62
ANDRADE, Diogo Thomson de; OLIVEIRA, Paulo Henrique de. Integrating competition and
industrial policies in Brazil: pathways to foster a dynamic digital economy through antitrust and
innovation. Revista de Defesa da Concorrência, Brasília, v. 13, n. 1, p. 57-72, 2025.
https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v13i1.1923
A central feature of this new wave of industrial policies is the creation of an environment
conducive to sustained innovation. This entails fostering synergies between the public and private
sectors, with government initiatives laying the groundwork for private enterprise innovation – for
instance, through public investments in digital infrastructure and education that help reduce entry
barriers for startups. This ensures that industrial policy does not merely protect existing industries
but actively promotes new technologies and business models (Rodrik, 2004; Aiginger; Rodrik, 2020).
Moreover, industrial policy must keep up with the pace of rapid technological change, as traditional
tools such as subsidies and taris oten fall short – lacking the speed and flexibility needed to meet
the evolving demands of the digital economy. Instead, policies should emphasize agility and focus
on developing capabilities that allow economies to switly seize emerging opportunities and address
evolving challenges. This includes investing in human capital, particularly in digital skills, to ensure
the workforce can benefit from the digital transformation (Draghi, 2024).
In this context, the adoption of new industrial policies can be better understood through
the lens of technological development, which has become a central focus in recent policy debates
(Mazzucato; Entsminger; Kattel, 2021). Aiginger and Rodrik (2020) argues that the state has a pivotal role
in providing a strategic framework for economic restructuring, particularly in promoting technological
dynamism and diversification. In the digital age, this role becomes critical as countries build digital
infrastructures and address systemic challenges such as global competition and the dominance of
digital platforms (Mazzucato; Entsminger; Kattel, 2021; Tirole, 2024).
Tirole (2024) adds that traditional market-based approaches, which prioritized minimal
intervention, are increasingly seen as inadequate in the face of market power concentrations. Instead,
modern industrial policies recognize the need for government involvement to overcome market
failures, especially in areas with high barriers to entry, network eects, and data control issues
(Draghi, 2024; Tirole, 2024). This perspective emphasizes the state’s role not only in regulating but
also in actively fostering the conditions for private sector innovation and competition.
Exemplifying this approach, the European Union has been developing policies and
initiatives that help illustrate part of this process of formulation and implementation, focusing on
both sustainability and technological development. The European Green Deal aims to decarbonize
the economy while fostering innovation in green technologies, demonstrating the evolving role of
industrial policy in achieving sustainability goals (European Commission, 2024a). Similarly, the EU
Digital Strategy seeks to maintain European competitiveness by investing in digital infrastructure,
promoting skills, and reducing reliance on foreign technology providers (European Commission,
2024b). These initiatives exemplify how well-designed, evidence-based policies can address global
challenges like climate change while also driving economic growth, aligning with the broader
objectives of modern industrial policy.
The United States’ CHIPS and Science Act is another example of interventionist industrial
policy that aims at fostering the conditions for private sector innovation and competition. The policy
is focused on boosting semiconductor production and reducing reliance on foreign suppliers and
reflects a commitment to technological sovereignty, which can be a double-edged sword (Fact […],
2022). On one hand, technological sovereignty is crucial for national security, as it ensures control
over critical technologies and reduces vulnerabilities associated with dependence on foreign
technology giants (Tucker et al., 2023). On the other hand, the focus on sovereignty can easily lead to
63
protectionist measures that prioritize domestic interests at the expense of international cooperation
and open markets. This tension highlights one of the key nuances of industrial policy: while it aims to
enhance national resilience, it also risks fostering protectionism that could stifle global competition
and innovation. Such potential negative eects must be carefully considered in the formulation of
industrial policies to strike a balance between national security and open, competitive markets.
Beyond these dimensions, there are also central concerns regarding the eects of industrial
policies on competition and, conversely, how competition can influence the design of incentives and
mechanisms to facilitate the entry of innovative agents. The OECD (2024) highlights the importance
of pro-competitive industrial policies, which ensure that technological development is pursued in an
environment where markets remain open to new entrants. This pro-competitive approach prevents
dominant players from stifling innovation, promoting the development of a more contestable digital
economy. Caarra and Lane (2024) also emphasize integrating competition elements into industrial
policies to avoid technological dependencies and promote diversity in digital markets.
These examples underscore how new industrial policies must foster both innovation and
competitiveness while avoiding pitfalls such as monopolization and technological lock-ins. This
debate opens up space for a deeper focus on the relationships between antitrust policy and industrial
policies - and on the role of competition policy in designing economic incentives. Such relationships
have oten been marked by tensions arising from the sometimes antagonistic objectives of both sets
of public policies.
3 THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND ANTITRUST BEFORE
AND AFTER THE DIGITAL AGE
The interplay between industrial policy and antitrust is oten characterized by both
complementarity and conflict
7
. As Sokol (2014) explains, the fundamental tension between industrial
policy and antitrust is rooted in their divergent goals: while traditional industrial policy promotes
government intervention to support certain industries or achieve specific economic outcomes,
traditional competition policy is primarily concerned with ensuring competition and consumer welfare.
This dichotomy can lead to conflicting outcomes when industrial policy interventions create
market advantages for certain firms, potentially clashing with antitrust objectives of maintaining
competitive neutrality and preventing monopolistic behavior (Sokol, 2014). The resurgence of industrial
policies in the 21st century – particularly in the context of a more protectionist and nationalist global
environment – has further intensified these tensions, underscoring the need for a careful balancing
of policy instruments to achieve both industrial and competitive policy goals. This more nuanced and
strategic approach stands in contrast to traditional industrial policy models, which have historically
been criticized for leading to ineciencies and distorting market outcomes (Ordover, 1987).
On the one hand, such policies can be instrumental in addressing market failures and
fostering technological development, especially in sectors where private investment is inadequate
7 Generally speaking, some scholars argue that competition policy is, in itself, a form of industrial policy. Viewed
through the lens of the economics of industrial organization, these concepts (the interaction between market failures and pub-
lic policies) are understood as distinct elements that, as Tirole (2015, 2024) points out, comprise a set of four central aspects:
(i) the regulation of public utilities; (ii) competition policy; (iii) consumer protection measures; and (iv) industrial policies.
64
ANDRADE, Diogo Thomson de; OLIVEIRA, Paulo Henrique de. Integrating competition and
industrial policies in Brazil: pathways to foster a dynamic digital economy through antitrust and
innovation. Revista de Defesa da Concorrência, Brasília, v. 13, n. 1, p. 57-72, 2025.
https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v13i1.1923
due to high risks or significant positive externalities (Rodrik, 2004; Mazzucato, 2016). On the other
hand, the use of industrial policy can be problematic, as it may foster protectionist tendencies that
lead to market distortions and hinder international competition (Ordover, 1987; Sokol, 2014). This dual
nature – balancing the role of government support with the risks of market manipulation – remains a
central challenge in integrating industrial and antitrust policies eectively
8
.
The rise of the digital economy has further reshaped the tensions between industrial policy
and antitrust. Tirole (2017, 2024) highlights how technological advancements, particularly the growth
of digital platforms, have blurred the lines between regulation and antitrust enforcement. Digital
platforms oten exhibit characteristics similar to public utilities, including high fixed costs, network
externalities, and low marginal costs, which complicates the distinction between sectors requiring
industrial support and those that need antitrust oversight. The evolving nature of digital platforms
has led to calls for treating them like public utilities, suggesting stricter regulations, breaking them up,
or utilizing tougher antitrust enforcement (Tirole, 2024). Indeed, the complexities of digital platforms
and their dominance create challenges for antitrust authorities, especially when addressing issues
related to the sharing of sensitive information and technologies among competitors for the purpose
of fostering sustainability and environmental preservation.
Furthermore, the geopolitical tensions of recent years have added to the complexities,
with industrial policy gaining renewed interest as a mechanism to ensure technological sovereignty
(Pasquale, 2017). Policies like the already mentioned European Digital Strategy and the US’s CHIPS and
Science Act exemplify the complexity of balancing strategic autonomy with open competition. While
these industrial policies aim to enhance sovereignty, they inherently risk reducing space for external
competition, potentially leading to market concentration and undermining fair competition. This
interplay between fostering national strategic interests and ensuring a competitive digital marketplace
represents one of the nuanced challenges of integrating industrial and antitrust policies eectively,
as industrial policy must address strategic vulnerabilities while avoiding anti-competitive outcomes.
The Digital Markets Act (DMA), in contrast, serves as an example of a competition policy that
adopts a regulatory model aimed at enhancing contestability and fairness within digital markets
9
. The
DMA targets major digital platforms – oten seen as gatekeepers – with the intention of mitigating
bottlenecks and reducing barriers to entry for smaller players. Tirole (2024) emphasizes that the DMA
addresses the need to improve access to critical services by imposing obligations on gatekeeper
platforms, ensuring they provide fair conditions for businesses relying on these platforms. By
promoting greater contestability, the DMA aims to counterbalance the concentration of power and
improve the functioning of digital markets, recognizing that platforms oten act as essential utilities
and bottlenecks. The focus on contestability and fairness aims to ensure that digital platforms remain
open to new entrants and foster a competitive environment, yet it also reflects the potential for
8 As previously mentioned, a potential approach to aligning industrial policy with antitrust objectives is through the
use of conditionalities. Mazzucato and Rodrik (2023) argue that government support for industries should be contingent on
conditions that ensure public value creation, such as fostering local innovation ecosystems and maintaining competitive dy-
namics. By incorporating these conditionalities, this approach aligns industrial policy interventions with the broader goal of
market eciency, helping to prevent monopolistic outcomes while promoting sectoral growth.
9 The DMA, despite its importance, should not be considered as an “ideal type” for all jurisdictions – mainly due to its
high regulatory costs and the significant state capacity required for implementation –, but rather as an example of a competi-
tion policy/regulatory design that has broad implications and interfaces with industrial policy. This is because it reshapes the
incentives and organizational structures of large platforms (and consequently of the service sectors in which they operate and
dominate) with competition goals in mind, while also generating significant industrial repercussions.
65
regulatory measures to have unintended protectionist eects, particularly when targeting specific
firms with significant market influence (Crémer et al., 2023).
Draghi (2024) advocates for a “joined-up approach” that aligns industrial and competition
policies, especially in strategic sectors like digital and green technologies. By integrating competition
considerations into industrial policy, governments can support sectoral development without undermining
market contestability. This approach is particularly important in the context of emerging technologies,
where state intervention is oten necessary but must be balanced with measures that ensure competitive
markets. Antitrust policy plays a critical role in fostering innovation by maintaining open and contestable
markets, which is crucial for the successful implementation of such joined-up approaches
10
.
As previously noted, the rise of large digital monopolies poses significant challenges for the
integration of industrial and antitrust policies, especially in an increasingly digitalized and data-driven
economy. The dominance of digital platforms has direct eects on multiple industrial sectors, as
these platforms oten serve as essential infrastructure for a wide range of economic activities. In this
context, transformations like the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) (Acemoglu; Restrepo,
2018; Acemoglu, 2021; Acemoglu; Autor; Johnson, 2023) and the need to build comprehensive digital
infrastructure have become central contentious points linking antitrust policies - focused on controlling
economic power in digital markets - to broader industrial policies focused on the development of
markets, technologies, and incentives, as well as governance and regulatory frameworks for these
new technologies. These three dimensions - competition, technological innovation, and regulatory
governance - oten overlap and intersect, being directly linked to many other areas of economic
public policy.
Thus, the challenge is not merely to regulate monopolistic power but also to ensure that
the use of AI and other digital technologies contributes to general welfare and aligns with socio-
economic objectives involving a diverse group of stakeholders, including workers, communities,
families, and businesses, rather than solely benefiting the dominant corporate giants. The leverage
that large digital platforms derive from their market dominance allows them to finance foundational
infrastructure, creating a complex landscape where monopoly rents are reinvested to further entrench
their position. This dynamic exacerbates entry barriers for potential competitors, making the role of
competition policy even more crucial. Antitrust measures must not only prevent anti-competitive
practices but also ensure that industrial policies create a balanced ecosystem where innovation and
socio-economic objectives can thrive without leading to entrenched monopolistic power (Acemoglu,
2021; Draghi, 2024; Tirole, 2024).
The coordination between industrial and antitrust policies in the context of digital platforms
can oer significant mutual benefits. Caarra (2024a, 2024b), for example, advocates for a more
sector-specific approach, where competition enforcement is closely aligned with industrial strategies
at the sector level, considering broader macroeconomic conditions and trade developments. Current
approaches, however, oten lack a nuanced understanding of investment and innovation dynamics,
10 In terms of the sustainability discussion, considerations of this kind are already being brought before antitrust au-
thorities, particularly in debates over the exchange of sensitive information and technologies between competitors to foster
environmental preservation/with sustainability concerns. The European Green Deal is another example, aiming to promote
sustainable industries, it provides a relevant example of how antitrust measures can eectively complement industrial policy.
By ensuring that green technologies do not become monopolized, the policy helps prevent market concentration, thereby en-
couraging broader innovation and adoption (European Commission, 2024a).
66
ANDRADE, Diogo Thomson de; OLIVEIRA, Paulo Henrique de. Integrating competition and
industrial policies in Brazil: pathways to foster a dynamic digital economy through antitrust and
innovation. Revista de Defesa da Concorrência, Brasília, v. 13, n. 1, p. 57-72, 2025.
https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v13i1.1923
relying too heavily on narrow market definitions and incremental market share assessments. Eective
coordination requires moving beyond these formulaic analyses to develop a more comprehensive
understanding of the broader landscape, ensuring that public investments in research and
development (R&D) and infrastructure foster genuine innovation and support new entrants, rather
than being captured by dominant players (Caarra, 2024a, 2024b; Caarra; Lane, 2024).
Consequently, the key challenge lies in designing antitrust frameworks that eectively
prevent predatory behaviors while aligning it with industrial policies aimed at strategic growth
and incentives realignment. This approach requires a nuanced understanding of both competition
and industrial strategies to ensure they complement each other, fostering a balanced environment
conducive to innovation and equitable growth. This integrated approach is crucial for ensuring that
both competition policy and industrial policy work in tandem to create a balanced ecosystem that
supports innovation, economic growth, and equitable opportunities for all market participants.
Given the various tensions and complexities in the relationship between competition and
industrial policies – particularly within the digital economy – it is useful to explore the Brazilian
case, a relevant example of a developing economy with distinctive structural characteristics. Like
many other countries, Brazil faces the significant challenge of designing policies that enable smaller
players to innovate and compete in markets shaped by dominant digital gatekeepers. An integrated
policy approach that aligns industrial and competition objectives could help lower access barriers
and create more equitable market conditions for emerging firms. In addition, Brazil risks falling into
a “middle/low-technology trap,” where incremental technological progress fails to translate into
sustained competitiveness and economic growth. Addressing these challenges calls for a coordinated,
evidence-based policy framework that not only limits the market power of entrenched players but
also fosters innovation and technological advancement across the broader economy.
4 GOVERNANCE, COMPETITION, AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN BRAZIL:
A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF CADE’S ROLE AT THE INTERSECTION OF
COMPETITION AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES
The “middle technology trap” refers to the stagnation experienced by countries that have
successfully developed mid-range technologies but struggle to transition to high-tech sectors. The
concept, as discussed by Fuest et al. (2024) and Tirole (2024), is predominantly presented in the
European context, where it highlights the diculties of advancing beyond incremental innovation to
achieve technological leadership. However, this discussion can be extended to Brazil, a large developing
economy with significant particularities. Brazil not only plays an important role as a platform for
digital governance but also faces a more extreme version of the middle technology trap – what
might be characterized as a “low technology trap.” This condition reflects a reliance on incremental
innovation in traditional sectors without sucient advancement into disruptive technologies, leaving
the country vulnerable to falling behind in an increasingly digital and AI-driven global economy.
Brazil may be experiencing a challenge similar to that of the European Union, though at
an even earlier stage – facing not a middle-technology trap, but rather a “low/middle-technology
trap”. To overcome this, the country must prioritize innovation policies that support high-risk,
high-reward projects, instead of focusing primarily on established mid-tech sectors. Following the
67
recommendations made for the EU, adopting an “ARPA-like”
11
approach with strategic and well-
defined public investments to enhance advanced technological capabilities could help Brazil break
free from this stagnation (Fuest et al., 2024). This Brazilian “low/middle technology trap” is a major
obstacle to economic growth, which requires coordinated policies that promote technological
progress, transition from mid-tech to high-tech industries, and foster innovation in strategic areas.
As previously mentioned, the development of technology hubs requires a mix of industrial policy,
competition incentives, and regulatory governance of the digital economy. In this context, it is valuable
to examine the historical development of governance mechanisms in Brazil.
Brazil has taken a relatively pioneering role in shaping a regulatory framework for the
digital space that uniquely blends market-oriented principles, rights-based approaches, and state
intervention within the context of a developing economy in the Global South. A key example of
this is the “Marco Civil da Internet” (Internet Civil Framework), enacted in 2014, which established
a set of rights, principles, and responsibilities for internet users and service providers, eectively
serving as Brazil’s “internet constitution.” It represents a landmark achievement in terms of digital
rights, ensuring net neutrality, privacy, and freedom of expression. Although the Marco Civil currently
generates some controversies, it plays an important role as the first regulatory framework established
by the Brazilian state to address the challenges of the digital economy. The Marco Civil also set an
important precedent for involving multiple stakeholders in internet governance, including civil
society, government, and the private sector.
This early initiative demonstrated Brazil’s commitment to promoting an open and inclusive
internet, highlighting the country’s potential in shaping the digital landscape. However, challenges
remain in translating such governance frameworks into broader innovation gains, particularly as the
digital economy becomes increasingly dominated by global platforms. The lessons from the Marco
Civil da Internet show that while legal frameworks are crucial for digital governance, they must be
complemented by targeted innovation policies to fully leverage digital transformation opportunities.
Additionally, these lessons highlight the need for regulatory and governance structures tailored to each
specific area impacted by platform actions, requiring the establishment of specialized bureaucracies
and techniques to address these issues eectively. Competition policy is just one of many fronts in
this broader regulatory process.
In recent years, the Brazilian federal government has undertaken multiple initiatives aimed at
regulating the digital economy. These include legislative proposals such as Bill 2338/2023, which seeks
to regulate AI in Brazil by establishing guidelines for its ethical and transparent use while promoting
technological innovation. Other initiatives include Bill 8889/2017, which proposes the regulation
of streaming services, and Bill 12/2024, which addresses labor conditions for app-based transport
workers. Additionally, the so-called “Fake News Bill” (PL 2630/2020) aims to combat disinformation,
and Bill 2768/2022 assigns regulatory responsibilities over digital platforms to Anatel (National
Telecommunications Agency). In relation to the broader scope of competition, a recent initiative by
the Ministry of Finance further expands this debate, corroborating Cade’s contribution to the public
consultation organized by the Ministry, emphasizing the need to expand the powers of the Brazilian
11 The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was founded in 1958 by the U.S. Department of Defense as a response
to the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik. Its primary mission was to avoid technological surprises by funding high-risk, high-re-
ward research and development initiatives. ARPA was instrumental in breakthrough innovations like ARPANET – the forerunner
of the internet – and laid the groundwork for what would later become DARPA.
68
ANDRADE, Diogo Thomson de; OLIVEIRA, Paulo Henrique de. Integrating competition and
industrial policies in Brazil: pathways to foster a dynamic digital economy through antitrust and
innovation. Revista de Defesa da Concorrência, Brasília, v. 13, n. 1, p. 57-72, 2025.
https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v13i1.1923
competition authority to address issues of market power in the digital environment (Ministério […], 2024).
These initiatives represent an eort to position Brazil as a significant player in the governance
of the digital economy, structuring a comprehensive framework that addresses multiple regulatory
aspects, including labor rights, content moderation, AI transparency, ethical standards, and fair
competition in digital markets. However, despite these initiatives, none of these proposals have
advanced in the national legislature, highlighting the diculties in constructing eective governance
mechanisms and the implications of a complex political economy that is challenging for both the
executive branch and advocates of new regulatory instruments.
On the other hand, in terms of industrial policy, Brazil seems to be working towards developing
a plan that aligns with international examples and the broader vision of the new role of industrial
policy for technology in the 21st century. The Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services
(MDIC) is a key agent in shaping this process, focusing on fostering inclusive technological growth. A
new dimension of this policy is emerging, emphasizing not only development through subsidies but
also reducing barriers to entry for smaller players and repositioning Brazil within the competitive
global technology landscape. The MDIC is committed to driving initiatives that support infrastructure
development, education, and innovation, with particular attention to AI as a strategic area for
technological advancement and economic competitiveness (MCTI, 2024).
In this sense, the Brazilian AI Plan, known as “IA para o Bem de Todos” (AI for the Benefit of
All) (MCTI, 2024), represents a significant shit in strategy, emphasizing inclusive growth and reducing
concentration in the tech sector. The plan outlines a broad range of strategic actions, such as
fostering public-private partnerships, supporting the development of AI infrastructure, and promoting
education and training in AI-related fields, thus creating opportunities for smaller companies to
innovate and participate actively in the digital economy. The plan includes substantial investments
in digital infrastructure, like constructing high-capacity data centers powered by renewable energy
and developing one of the world’s most powerful supercomputers. These initiatives aim to make
the digital landscape more accessible and provide an environment that encourages new entrants,
enhancing Brazil’s competitiveness in the AI sector.
Furthermore, the Brazilian AI Plan focuses on building a sustainable and inclusive innovation
ecosystem. With over R$ 23 billion in planned investments from 2024 to 2028, the plan’s strategy
revolves around infrastructure development, capacity building, and regulatory support for AI.
Establishing a network of regional centers of excellence in AI, promoting the use of AI in public
services, and ensuring data sovereignty through models that reflect Brazil’s cultural diversity are
key elements of the plan (MCTI, 2024). These eorts aim not only to enhance Brazil’s technological
competitiveness but also to integrate underserved regions and communities into the digital economy,
contributing to a more equitable high-tech landscape.
Returning to the role and actions of Cade, it's understood that within this set of distinct
initiatives, Cade can and should fulfill three distinct roles beyond its already established functions
and its role as an organizer of antitrust public policy and competition advocacy.
First, Cade should strengthen its actions in structural analysis and conduct assessment
through the ex post model already exercised by the authority. This would involve enhancing its
current capabilities to eectively analyze and respond to anti-competitive behavior ater it occurs,
ensuring accountability and market fairness. Second, Cade should focus on developing initiatives on
69
the administrative level and work directly with the executive branch to establish a new regulatory
framework. This framework would position Cade as the central regulator of competition in digital
markets, using ex ante tools to prevent anti-competitive behavior before it takes place. By proactively
shaping market conditions, Cade can help create an environment that deters monopolistic practices
and encourages fair competition from the outset. Third, Cade should cooperate with other regulatory
agencies and ministries to play an ancillary role in developing competition-promoting measures that
align with broader public policies, such as the Brazilian AI program. This cooperation would ensure that
these initiatives have pro-competitive foundations and eects, contributing to an environment where
policies not only support innovation but also ensure a level playing field for all market participants,
thereby fostering a more dynamic and inclusive digital economy.
An illustrative example of the complex interplay between industrial and competition policy in
Brazil is the development of Pix by the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB). Pix is more than just a payment
tool – it constitutes a form of digital public infrastructure and reflects a deliberate industrial policy
intervention aimed at increasing competitiveness and eciency in the banking and payments sectors.
By introducing a low-cost, real-time, and universally accessible payment system, the state eectively
entered the market with a transformative product that restructured incentives and business models,
particularly impacting incumbents such as acquirers and card networks. This move underscores the
dual nature of the state’s role – not only as a regulator but also, in some sense, as a market participant.
This dual role introduces a unique tension in the application of competition policy. On one
hand, competition enforcement authorities such as Cade must ensure that the scale and asymmetric
power of state-led interventions – like Pix – do not inadvertently suppress competitive market
structures or crowd out private innovation. On the other hand, Cade must also be prepared to
shield such public innovations from retaliatory or exclusionary strategies by incumbent firms whose
entrenched market positions are disrupted by these exogenous shocks. In this sense, the role of
competition policy is ambivalent: it must safeguard the market from both the potential distortions
introduced by state intervention and the anti-competitive reactions from dominant private actors.
To fulfill this dual function, competition policy must be embedded into the very design and
rationale of industrial policy from the outset. This means incorporating competitive safeguards and
market contestability goals into the initial policy framework – a “quasi ex ante” role – while also
maintaining a formal ex post function of monitoring, enforcement, and remedial action. The case of
Pix illustrates the need for greater institutional coordination: while the Central Bank leads the policy
initiative, agencies such as Cade should be involved early in the process to help design mechanisms that
mitigate potential harms to market dynamics and ensure the long-term sustainability of competitive
conditions. This coordination could also extend to innovation-focused institutions like MDIC and the
Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MCTI), reinforcing a more integrated and strategic
governance model for industrial and competition policies in Brazil’s digital economy. By supporting
these initiatives, Brazil aims to create an environment where innovation is accessible to a diverse
set of players, regardless of size or capital capacity. The emphasis on infrastructure and training
within the Brazilian AI Plan is vital to reducing barriers for new entrants and enabling smaller firms to
compete eectively in a landscape oten dominated by larger platforms. This inclusive approach may
prove essential for creating a resilient digital economy that aligns with broader socio-economic goals.
In this context, ongoing eorts to democratize AI development - if paired with a more proactive and
adaptive regulatory stance from Cade - could potentially contribute to reshaping Brazil’s competitive
70
ANDRADE, Diogo Thomson de; OLIVEIRA, Paulo Henrique de. Integrating competition and
industrial policies in Brazil: pathways to foster a dynamic digital economy through antitrust and
innovation. Revista de Defesa da Concorrência, Brasília, v. 13, n. 1, p. 57-72, 2025.
https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v13i1.1923
landscape in ways that promote inclusive, sustainable growth. More broadly, a truly comprehensive
competition policy must extend beyond traditional antitrust analysis, encompassing the unique
challenges of the digital economy, sustainability, labor rights, and the competitiveness of small
enterprises. By incorporating these diverse aspects, Brazil can build a regulatory framework that not
only supports innovation but also protects consumer rights and promotes an equitable environment
for all market participants. This inclusive approach is essential for creating a resilient digital economy
that meets broader socio-economic goals.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this article underscores the evolving relationship between industrial and
competition policies, highlighting the importance of a more integrated approach within the digital
economy. The analysis of Brazil’s areas of action - regulatory governance, competition enforcement,
and industrial policy - demonstrates the complexity of balancing state intervention and market
competition. Cade’s role, as both a regulator and a promoter of innovation, is pivotal in maintaining
this balance, showing how antitrust enforcement can align with broader industrial objectives without
compromising competition.
These preliminary insights indicate that a comprehensive competition policy must go beyond
traditional antitrust measures to address the challenges of the digital economy, sustainability, labor
issues, and the competitiveness of small enterprises. By incorporating these diverse aspects, Brazil
can create a regulatory framework that fosters innovation, protects consumer rights, and ensures fair
competition for all market participants. This inclusive and forward-looking approach is crucial for
building a resilient and dynamic digital economy that supports broader socio-economic objectives.
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