36
RENZETTI, Bruno Polonio; OLIVEIRA, Daniele Eduarda de. Is there a Brazilian experience with
remedies in digital markets? An empirical analysis of decisions by Cade. Revista de Defesa da
Concorrência, Brasília, v. 13, n. 1, p. 36-56, 2025.
https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v13i1.1933
IS THERE A BRAZILIAN
EXPERIENCE WITH
REMEDIES IN DIGITAL
MARKETS? AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS
BY CADE
1
EXISTE UMA EXPERIÊNCIA BRASILEIRA COM
REMÉDIOS EM MERCADOS DIGITAIS? ANÁLISE
EMPÍRICA DE DECISÕES DO CADE
Bruno Polonio Renzetti
2
Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa (INSPER) – São Paulo, SP - Brasil
Daniele Eduarda de Oliveira
3
Escola de Direito da Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV/SP) - São Paulo, SP – Brasil
STRUCTURED SUMMARY
Objective: The paper investigates how Cade has applied remedies in digital markets. The objective
is to verify whether the Brazilian authority has developed a singular experience in imposing digital
remedies or if it has been following trends from other jurisdictions, particularly the European Union
and the United States. The research question is relevant given that Brazil, as an emerging economy,
faces specific challenges in dealing with large digital platforms, while also playing a key role in the
Latin American and Global South economy.
Method: Literature review and case study.
Conclusions: The authors conclude that the Brazilian authority has not experimented with specific
remedies for digital markets, oten applying measures that have been applied in non-digital
investigations or mergers. There has not been a tailor-made remedies approach to digital markets in
the practice of Cade so far. In this sense, the authors urge Cade to develop a comprehensive framework
to deal with competitive problems specific to digital markets.
1 Editor responsável: Prof. Dr. Victor Oliveira Fernandes, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade), Brasília,
DF, Brasil.
Lattes: http://lattes.cnpq.br/5250274768971874. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5431-4142.
Recebido em: 16/01/2025 Aceito em: 11/06/2025 Publicado em: 25/06/2025
2 Doutor em Direito Comercial pela Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo. Master of Laws (LL.M.) pela Yale
Law School. Professor da graduação e pós-graduação em Direito do Insper, em São Paulo, SP.
E-mail: brunopr5@insper.edu.br Lattes: https://lattes.cnpq.br/0552342887882392 ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8249-
4451
3 Mestranda em Direito e Desenvolvimento pela Escola de Direito da Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV/SP). Bacharel em
Direito pela Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo.
E-mail: daniele.eduarda98@hotmail.com Lattes: http://lattes.cnpq.br/0994673076761610 ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0000-
0415-8241
2
37
Keywords: Remedies; Digital Markets; Mergers; Investigations; Enforcement.
JEL Codes:K21, L40, L49
RESUMO ESTRUTURADO
Objetivo: o artigo investiga como remédios têm sido aplicados pelo Cade em casos envolvendo
mercado digitais. O objetivo é verificar se a autoridade brasileira desenvolveu uma experiência
singular na imposição de remédios digitais ou se tem seguido tendências de outras jurisdições,
particularmente da União Europeia e dos Estados Unidos. A questão de pesquisa é relevante dado
que o Brasil, como uma economia emergente, enfrenta desafios específicos ao lidar com grandes
plataformas digitais, ao mesmo tempo em que desempenha um importante papel na economia da
América Latina e do Sul Global.
Método: revisão bibliográfica de literatura e estudo de casos.
Conclusões: os autores concluem que a autoridade brasileira não possui experiência na aplicação
de remédios específicos para mercados digitais, recorrendo frequentemente à medidas que foram
adotadas em atos de concentração ou investigações de mercados não-digitais. Até o momento, não
houve uma abordagem sob medida para remédios em mercados digitais na prática do Cade. Nesse
sentido, os autores sugerem que o Cade desenvolva um marco orientativo abrangente para lidar com
problemas competitivos específicos dos mercados digitais.
Palavras-chave: Remédios; Mercados Digitais; Atos de Concentração; Investigações; Enforcement.
Summary: 1. Introduction; 2. The Role of Antitrust
Remedies in the Digital Economy; 3. Challenges faced by
Authorities when imposing remedies in Digital Markets;
4. Case Studies: the Brazilian experience with remedies
in digital markets; 4.1 Merger Control; 4.1.1. Itaú/XP; 4.1.2.
Nike/SBF; 4.1.3. Bus/J3; 4.1.4. Catena X; 4.2. Anticompetitive
Investigations; 4.2.1. Google Shopping; 4.2.2. OTAs; 4.2.3.
iFood/Rappi; 4.2.4. Gympass/TotalPass; 4.2.5. Jedi Blue;
4.2.6. Meta AI 4.2.7. Apple App Store; 4.3. Findings; 5.
Conclusion and Recommendations; References.
1 INTRODUCTION
It is well established that antitrust scholarship and enforcement have seen significant changes
in the past decade. The ubiquity of digital markets has called for a necessary revision of the role of
antitrust in modern economies and how to approach the challenges posed by a digital economy
dominated by very few players. The fact that many academic think-tanks, competition authorities and
supranational organizations have released lengthy reports on the capacity of antitrust to deal with
the challenges posed by the digital economy
4
reinforces its significance on a global scale.
4 A comprehensive analysis of several expert reports on competition in digital markets can be found in Lancieri e
Sakowski (2021).
38
RENZETTI, Bruno Polonio; OLIVEIRA, Daniele Eduarda de. Is there a Brazilian experience with
remedies in digital markets? An empirical analysis of decisions by Cade. Revista de Defesa da
Concorrência, Brasília, v. 13, n. 1, p. 36-56, 2025.
https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v13i1.1933
If antitrust were a medical patient, the diagnosis would be clear: the current framework available
to antitrust authorities is not enough to contest the illness of market concentration. Once the illness has
been identified, the challenge is to determine which remedies to apply to treat the condition.
Depending on the seriousness of the malady, a competition authority may impose a more
intrusive remedy – such as a structural break-up or mandatory sale of assets. Conversely, if the
problem is considered less severe, behavioral remedies may suce.
5
In any case, the authority must
balance the eects of over- or under-enforcement when applying such measures.
There is a wide menu of remedies
6
that a competition authority may choose from the large
categories of structural and behavioral approaches. The goal of this paper is to verify whether the
Administrative Council for Economic Defense (Cade), the Brazilian antitrust authority, follows any, any
pattern when imposing remedies in cases involving digital markets. We aim to provide a comprehensive
overview of Cade’s experience with such interventions in digital markets, aiming to understand the
authority’s rationale in adopting a given approach.
The relevance of this study is underscored by two key factors. First, developing countries face
unique challenges in regulating digital markets, oten stemming from less developed institutional
frameworks, limited regulatory capacity, and insucient resources to implement complex antitrust
measures. In this context, examining the approach of a developing country—particularly one that is
a member of the BRICS - provides valuable insights into how these challenges are addressed within
the broader competition policy framework. Second, Cade’s influence extends not only throughout
Latin America but also across the Global South
7
. In recent years, the authority has consistently ranked
among the top competition authorities globally
8
. With its influence acknowledged by the Organisation
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)
9
, Cade is an ideal subject for studying the
dynamics of competition policy in the context of digital platforms within developing economies. In
this sense, this paper aims to oer insights on how Brazil can further enhance its competition policies,
providing guidance not only for its regulatory framework but also valuable lessons for other emerging
economies facing similar challenges.
Bearing in mind such considerations, the remaining question is whether there is a specific
Brazilian experience with the application of digital remedies
10
. If such experience is lacking, the paper
5 “Behavioral remedies are therefore only intended to temporarily restrict the competitive behavior of the parties to
enable operators (competitors, customers or suppliers) to react to the structural modification of the market that has occurred
as a result of a merger strengthening the market power of a stakeholder. They do not aim to fix the competitive structure of a
market, and as such form part of a dynamic prospective analysis that incorporates the capacity of economic stakeholders to
react to the changes.” (Autorité de la Concurrence, 2020, p. 264).
6 The term “remedy” is commonly used in antitrust to refer to commitments or restrictions undertaken by parties or
imposed by an antitrust authority to address competition concerns or correct harm to competition (Halperin, 2025).
7 In this article, the term “Global South” refers to a group of countries typically characterized by their developing
economies, regardless of their geographic location. For instance, the BRICS countries are oten considered part of the Global
South, which, despite ongoing debates about whether these economies should still be considered developing, continue to
be classified as such based on various indicators. It is crucial to note that the term does not imply that these countries are
homogeneous. Instead, it highlights that, despite their vast economic, social, and political dierences, they share common
vulnerabilities and challenges.
8 As reflected in the international ranking annually published by the Global Competition Review (GCR) – a British
journal specialized in antitrust policy and competition law.
9 The OECD’s 2019 peer review highlights Cade as an “international standing as a leading competition authority both
regionally and globally “ (OECD, 2019, p. 24).
10 In this article, the term “digital remedies” refers to measures or conditions imposed by antitrust authorities to
39
seeks to explore how Cade could eectively apply antitrust remedies in digital markets by adapting
practices from developed jurisdictions, considering Brazil’s unique challenges and capacities. To
address this issue, the paper is structured into the following sections, besides this introduction: (i) The
Role of Antitrust Remedies in the Digital Economy, examining the theoretical and practical significance
of these measures; (ii) Challenges Faced by Developing Countries; (iii) Case Studies of Antitrust
Remedies in Brazil, scrutinizing specific instances of antitrust interventions; (iv) Recommendations,
oering tailored strategies for Brazil; and (v) Conclusion, summarizing key findings and implications
for policy and practice.
2 THE ROLE OF ANTITRUST REMEDIES IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY
The capacity to impose remedies is one of the many typical attributions of a National
Competition Authority (NCA). In fact, the existence of a NCA would not be justified if the authority
did not have the power to intervene in markets, curbing anticompetitive conduct and market
concentration, therefore correcting the path sought for sustainable economic development.
While merger review conducted by NCAs typically adopts a forward-looking approach —
assessing the potential anticompetitive eects of a transaction before it takes place and, when
necessary, imposing remedies to prevent harm to market competition — the enforcement of
anticompetitive conduct usually follows a backwards looking logic, when the goal is to restore the
status quo ante of the market while sanctioning the anticompetitive player, aiming to deter future
violations
11
. In some cases, the remedy may be more straightforward: for example, mandating for an
exclusive distribution agreement to cease, and therefore creating alternative sales channels. There
are cases, however, in which the dynamics of the markets involved do not provide a clear answer on
how the NCA should act.
Such is the case with digital markets. The rapid evolution of this sector presents unique
challenges for competition authorities, requiring a more agile response. Key concerns identified
include high market concentrations driven by factors such as network externalities and switching costs
(UNCTAD, 2024). Mergers oten involve multi-sided platforms serving dierent user groups - such as
consumers and advertisers - with interactions between these groups creating complex dynamics that
can amplify network eects and lead to increased market concentration, where traditional remedies
may not be sucient. In this regard, certain authorities are already contemplating the implementation
of ex ante regulation for digital mergers, aiming to expand the range of potential remedies.
12
Beyond acquisitions, addressing anticompetitive practices in these markets is equally
address competition concerns within digital markets. “Digital markets” are understood as those primarily driven by digital
technologies, such as e-commerce platforms, social media networks, search engines, and digital service providers.
11 “Antitrust remedies seek to deter anticompetitive conduct. But antitrust remedies serve an additional purpose ater
occurrence of anticompetitive conduct. They seek to restore a competitive equilibrium as close as possible to the ‘but for’
world that would have prevailed absent the anticompetitive conduct, while not imposing excessive implementation costs on
antitrust courts and agencies and preventing the reoccurrence of the unlawful conduct. It is generally agreed that antitrust
remedies applied to date in digital markets have not met these goals and have largely been ineective” (Gal; Petit, 2021, p. 619).
12 “Hence there seems to be a broad consensus that some form ex ante regulation is needed as a complement to com-
petition law enforcement to deliver fast and eective action against structural barriers and risks of anti-competitive practices
in rapidly evolving digital platform markets. That said, national competition authorities as well as jurisdictions still dier in
what they see as the best approach: whether they want separate sector-type ex ante regulation; new competition law instru-
ments or simply an adaptation of existing competition law tools” (OECD, 2021, p. 12).
40
RENZETTI, Bruno Polonio; OLIVEIRA, Daniele Eduarda de. Is there a Brazilian experience with
remedies in digital markets? An empirical analysis of decisions by Cade. Revista de Defesa da
Concorrência, Brasília, v. 13, n. 1, p. 36-56, 2025.
https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v13i1.1933
challenging, as traditional frameworks may not eectively tackle the complexities of digital
ecosystems. A recent example of the diculties faced by authorities when designing remedies in
digital markets is the Google Search case in the United States.
13
In his decision of August 2024, Judge
Amit P. Mehta of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that Google was
a monopolist and had acted to maintain its monopoly in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
However, no remedy was imposed at the time. In October 2024 the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ)
filed a Proposed Remedy Framework, laying what the authorities understand to be the most suitable
remedies for Google’s monopoly position (USA, 2024).
The DoJ identified four key areas of concern: search distribution and revenue sharing;
generation and display of search results; advertising scale and monetization; and accumulation and
use of data. The remedies to prevent monopoly maintenance would then be related to contractual
requirements – including non-discrimination and data interoperability – as well as potential structural
requirements. A decision on the remedies is expected to be released in 2025.
The menu of remedies proposed by the DoJ demonstrates the need to think of remedies in
digital markets not to address only one aspect of the anticompetitive conduct but to encompass a
larger number of concerns
14
. Considering the several economic activities that digital platforms have
in numerous relevant markets, as well as the business structures of such players, it is ever more
dicult to pinpoint and individualize a single aspect of a digital platform that would be producing
anticompetitive eects in the market.
Crating tailored approaches to remedies in digital markets is crucial and complex, but
undoubtedly necessary. In the European context, authors have argued that the European Commission,
even though constrained by the legal framework, has enough room to develop more creative remedies
(Bostoen; Van Wamel, 2023, p. 540). Additionally, some cases may call for immediate measures from
the authorities, to minimize potential market damage in rapidly evolving digital landscapes. Interim
measures are an important tool to be used by antitrust authorities and must be on the menu of
adequate measures to address concerns in digital markets (OECD, 2022a, p. 20). Thus, competition
authorities play a crucial role in maintaining markets contestable and assuring that consumers
benefit from the competitive process.
The OECD Handbook on Competition Policy in the Digital Age suggests several strategies for
the eective implementation of remedies by the competition authorities (OECD, 2022b). For instance,
enhancing interoperability
15
and data portability is vital, allowing users to switly change between
platforms, reducing barriers to entry and switching costs. Moreover, line of business remedies
16
, such
as prohibiting exclusive practices, are also helpful in preventing monopolization and exclusionary
practices and maintaining market access for competitors.
13 In the Matter of Google, Inc., FTC File Number 111-0163 (USA, 2013).
14 DoJ’s proposed remedy was submitted under the Biden administration. However, the Trump administration has rein-
forced the government’s intention to seek a structural remedy to address the anticompetitive behavior of Google in the market
for online search engines (McCabe, 2025).
15 For a more skeptical vision of interoperability as an adequate remedy in digital markets, see Hovenkamp (2023),
Antitrust Interoperability Remedie.
16 “Line of business restrictions are used to address competition concerns associated with vertical integration or con-
glomerate business models in specific situations. In particular, they may be used to address concerns about refusals to deal,
margin squeeze, or bundling. These restrictions can be imposed in the context of abuse of dominance (or monopolization)
investigations, merger control, or regulation” (OECD, 2022, p. 55).
41
The issue is that past experiences show that “traditional” remedies have not been successful
in digital markets
17
. This has led authors to call for new remedy designs. For instance, Lancieri e Pereira
Neto (2022, p. 613) propose an error-cost framework to identify the most suitable substantive remedy,
as well as identifying which regulatory body would be the most appropriate to implement and monitor
the remedy
18
. Other authors have advocated for more “radical” remedies (Gal; Pettit, 2021)
19
.
Fact is that designing remedies is not a simple task – and has become more arduous in
digital markets. There is no one size fits all. Remedies that may have worked in a specific case may
not be suitable for another situation, as similar as they could be. Also, the types of remedies found
in competition law textbooks cannot be applied indistinctly across industries. The characteristics of
digital markets call for finely tailored remedies, taking particularly into account the business model
of the players. Understanding the business model is of paramount importance for a competition
authority to impose an adequate remedy capable of being monitored.
3 CHALLENGES FACED BY AUTHORITIES WHEN IMPOSING REMEDIES IN
DIGITAL MARKETS
Despite global recommendations and the recognition of the need for eective measures to
ensure fair competition in digital markets, developing economies oten face significant challenges in
achieving these goals. Financial constraints, a lack of specialized personnel, and the nascent stage of
their digital markets hinder the ability to implement robust antitrust measures.
As highlighted in the World Bank report Antitrust and Digital Platforms: An Analysis of Global
Patterns and Approaches by Competition Authorities (World Bank, 2021), developed countries generally
have the resources and institutional capacity to enforce comprehensive and targeted remedies. In
contrast, developing nations face significant challenges, both in designing eective solutions and
in implementing them. The report examines 103 competition cases, of which 44 resulted in the
imposition of remedies, including fines
20
. Unsurprisingly, most of the substantial fines and remedies
17 “Remedies imposed for competition law infringements (‘antitrust remedies’) have not been very eective in digital
markets. Antitrust remedies that were imposed on tech companies such as Microsot and Google failed to produce meaningful
eects in the EU. While the remedial measures may have addressed the illegal conduct narrowly defined, they were largely
unable to mitigate the infringements’ anticompetitive consequences” (Bostoen; Van Wamel, 2024, p. 1)
18 “Choosing the right remedy is an exercise prone to errors that can lead to costly over and under-enforcement. As a
general rule, authorities should be willing to impose more stringent remedies as they increase their certainty on the negative
eects of a particular conduct. This also means being more cautious when testing new theories of harm. Above all, any complex
remedy must be understood as a dynamic exercise that is reviewed over time and adjusted as more information on its impact
on actual behavior comes forth” (Lancieri; Pereira Neto, 2022, p. 667).
19 The authors advocate for mandatory sharing of algorithmic learning, subsidization of competitors, and temporary
shutdowns. “All three proposed remedies are radical in more than one way. First, they go beyond halting specific anticom-
petitive conduct or imposing financial sanctions. Their goal is to change the dynamics of market equilibrium produced by an
antitrust violation, by attacking entrenching features such as incumbency advantages, large returns to scale and scope, the
significance of data as a competitive advantage, and strong network eects. Second, the remedies entail a degree of govern-
ment interference with freedom of enterprise and property rights which is substantially higher than that associated with the
market-drive process which normally governs the design of antitrust remedies. However, the remedies all aim to restore the
competitive process, not to impose a competitive outcome. As such, they fall short of more interventional forms of economic
regulation. Third, the remedies generate complex tradeos which must be carefully balanced, as they could lead to either con-
sumer welfare gains (such as increased product variety with the introduction of a new competitor) or losses (such as switching
costs or sacrifices in the short-term performance of users in case of a shutdown” (Gal; Petit, 2021).
20 It may be argued that “fines” are not exactly remedies because they serve a punitive function, but they do have a
twofold aim: to penalize previous conduct and deter future conducts. According to the European Commission “[t]he purpose of
fines is to sanction undertakings for having infringed competition rules, in order to deter these undertakings as well as other
42
RENZETTI, Bruno Polonio; OLIVEIRA, Daniele Eduarda de. Is there a Brazilian experience with
remedies in digital markets? An empirical analysis of decisions by Cade. Revista de Defesa da
Concorrência, Brasília, v. 13, n. 1, p. 36-56, 2025.
https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v13i1.1933
were imposed by developed jurisdictions, particularly in cases involving anticompetitive conduct.
For instance, the European Commission imposed a record (at the time) $4.5 billion dollars fine on
Google in 2018 for abuse of dominance related to its Android operating system, and Apple was fined
$450 million dollars by the DoJ for a vertical restraints case in the e-book market. In contrast, in
developing jurisdictions, most remedies were applied to merger cases, with only a few addressing
anticompetitive conduct (World Bank, 2021, p. 54)
21
.
This disparity highlights a broader trend: while high-income countries have been proactive in
addressing competition issues in digital markets, developing economies have typically adopted a more
reactive approach. This passive stance may result in something similar to the “Brussels Eect”
22
, whereby
the regulatory frameworks of powerful economies, such as the EU, influence global business practices,
compelling developing nations to adopt standards that may not align with their local contexts. The fact
that the first comprehensive regulation of digital markets, focusing on contestability and fairness of the
markets, came from the European Union (the Digital Markets Act) is a testament to this.
The absence of tailored legal frameworks for digital markets in many developing countries
is a key factor that highlights the influence of developed economies. As the global tech industry
evolves rapidly, regulatory frameworks in emerging economies frequently lag, hindering their ability
to address the complex challenges posed by digital platforms - such as data-driven market power,
multi-sided platforms, and anti-competitive practices - that do not fit neatly within traditional
antitrust models. Moreover, the global dominance of large tech companies exacerbates enforcement
challenges in these jurisdictions, as local authorities oten lack both the legal tools and institutional
capacity to address the market power of multinational corporations.
One of the World Bank’s key recommendations is that authorities in developing jurisdictions
should integrate emerging issues — such as data — related concerns — into their analyses while
strengthening their capacity in these areas by leveraging the experiences and insights from developed
economies. Valuable lessons can be drawn from international cases where antitrust authorities in the
European Union and the United Kingdom have imposed significant remedies in high-profile matters,
such as the Google/Fitbit and Microsot/Activision Blizzard mergers. These cases illustrate how NCAs
can address digital market challenges by securing commitments that foster fair competition, such as
preventing the misuse of consumer data and promoting interoperability across platforms.
undertakings from engaging in or continuing behavior which restricts competition” (European Commission, 2025). However,
fines that have been applied to large tech companies only represent a small fraction of that company’s turnover.
21 “Remedies or conditions have been imposed in 20 cases: in developing jurisdictions, this is largely in merger cases,
while in developed jurisdictions, it is mostly in abuse of dominance cases. The cases that resulted in remedies or conditions
are split evenly between developed and developing jurisdictions; however, the distribution among types of cases diers signifi-
cantly. In developing jurisdictions, most cases with conditions are mergers (78 percent). Developing jurisdictions only imposed
remedies in one abuse of dominance case and one anticompetitive agreement case. In developed jurisdictions, cases with
remedies are split more evenly among abuse of dominance cases, mergers, and anticompetitive agreements” (World Bank,
2021, p. 54).
22 “The Brussels Eect refers to the EU’s unilateral power to regulate global markets. Without the need to use interna-
tional institutions or seek other nations’ cooperation, the EU has the ability to promulgate regulations that shape the global
business environment, leading to a notable “Europeanization” of many important aspects of global commerce. Dierent from
many other forms of global influence, the EU does not need to impose its standards coercively on anyone—market forces alone
are oten sucient to convert the EU standard into the global standard as companies voluntarily extend the EU rule to govern
their worldwide operations. Under specific conditions, the Brussels Eect leads to “unilateral regulatory globalization,” where
regulations originating from a single jurisdiction penetrate many aspects of economic life across the global marketplace”
(Bradford, 2020, p. xiv).
43
The European Commission’s approval of Google’s acquisition of Fitbit was conditional on a
series of remedies designed to address potential anti-competitive eects, particularly in the digital
health and wearable technology market
23
. Although the merger raised only limited horizontal overlaps,
the Commission identified key concerns around Google’s ability to leverage Fitbit’s data to strengthen
its position in digital advertising, restrict access to Fitbit’s data for competitors, and potentially limit
the interoperability of Fitbit devices with Android smartphones. To resolve these concerns, Google
committed to three main remedies.
First, Google agreed not to use Fitbit’s health and fitness data for advertising purposes,
maintaining a strict separation between Fitbit data and Google’s advertising systems in a “data
silo,” eectively preventing any unfair advantage in targeted advertising. Second, Google committed
to continuing to oer free and non-discriminatory access to Fitbit’s Web API, ensuring that third-
party developers can still build applications and services for Fitbit users, subject to GDPR consent.
Third, Google agreed to maintain and license essential Android APIs to competitors to preserve the
interoperability between Fitbit devices and Android smartphones.
The remedies, with a duration of up to ten years, are specifically designed to safeguard
competition in the dynamic digital and health tech markets, where data control, platform access,
and interoperability is crucial. The role of a trustee with expertise in data governance ensures that
these commitments are eectively monitored, addressing the fast-evolving nature of the markets
while preventing Google from abusing its market position. The remedies also reflect the EU’s growing
focus on regulating big tech mergers to preserve fair competition and consumer choice, particularly
in nascent sectors like digital health.
The CMA’s decision to clear the Microsot/Activision Blizzard merger on October 2023 followed
a significant restructuring of the deal (CMA, 2023). The British authority initially blocked the merger
due to concerns that Microsot, with its vast ecosystem, could harm competition in cloud gaming by
withholding the videogame Call of Duty from rival platforms. Unlike the European Commission, which
accepted behavioral remedies such as licensing deals for cloud streaming rights, the CMA rejected
the measures, expressing skepticism about their enforceability in the rapidly evolving digital market.
The CMA’s preference for structural remedies — such as divestitures — was a key factor in its decision.
The final remedy involved the divestiture of Activision’s non-EEA cloud streaming rights to Ubisot,
ensuring that these rights were no longer part of Microsot’s acquisition.
Additionally, Microsot agreed to behavioral commitments to monitor and enforce the
divestiture, including ensuring the eective transfer of rights to Ubisot for 15 years. These remedies
were designed to prevent Microsot from leveraging its ecosystem power to exclude competitors in
the growing cloud gaming market. The CMA’s focus on structural remedies, especially in the digital
realm, reflects its concern that behavioral measures could be dicult to enforce, especially in dynamic
and fast-changing sectors like cloud gaming, where innovation and new entrants are frequent
24
. This
approach highlights a cautious stance toward behavioral remedies, preferring solutions that directly
alter market structures and reduce the likelihood of anti-competitive conduct.
Beyond these examples, South-South collaboration oers additional valuable insights,
as low- and middle-income countries could benefit from sharing experiences and adapting global
23 Case M.9660, Google/Fitbit (European Commission, 2020).
24 See Greenwood and Robert (2024) for a comprehensive overview of the CMA’s recent activities.
44
RENZETTI, Bruno Polonio; OLIVEIRA, Daniele Eduarda de. Is there a Brazilian experience with
remedies in digital markets? An empirical analysis of decisions by Cade. Revista de Defesa da
Concorrência, Brasília, v. 13, n. 1, p. 36-56, 2025.
https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v13i1.1933
best practices to their specific contexts. For instance, the BRICS countries have been engaging in
discussions about the challenges of competition enforcement in digital markets, covering topics such
as market power assessment, innovation and dynamic competition, the acquisition of entrants by
incumbents, algorithmic pricing, and big data. As a result, Brazil’s competition authority released a
report in September 2019 (updated in 2024) on competition policy in the digital economy (Cade, 2024a).
This example of horizontal collaboration demonstrates how countries with similar developmental
challenges can share more relevant and actionable insights.
The individual proactive engagement of competition authorities in the digital debate is also
emphasized by the World Bank, a commitment clearly reflected in the actions of agencies like Cade.
The Brazilian authority has demonstrated a strong interest in digital markets, actively participating
in discussions and initiatives surrounding this area. However, it remains unclear to what extent it has
developed and implemented remedies specifically tailored to the unique challenges of digital markets.
4 CASE STUDIES: THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE WITH REMEDIES IN DIGITAL
MARKETS
As aforementioned, we recognize that Cade has been increasingly involved in the discourse
surrounding digital markets. The federal agency has published studies, organized key events, and
contributed to parliamentary debates on platform regulation, expressing its interest in assuming
a regulatory role. Despite this growing engagement, its experience in applying targeted antitrust
remedies specifically to digital markets appears to remain limited. To assess its eectiveness in this
area, this chapter examines several high-profile cases to determine whether the authority has applied
remedies suited to the unique characteristics of digital markets or whether its approach remains
anchored in traditional antitrust tools.
4.1 Merger Control
Brazil’s approach on merger control in digital markets seems to be relatively passive. While
the authority has reviewed numerous mergers in the digital sector in recent years, the application of
remedies has been limited. According to a report written by Cade’s Department of Economic Studies
(Cade, 2023) (hereinater DEE Report) from 1995 to 2020, 143 merger notifications related to digital
markets were filed, a significant portion of which involved sectors such as online advertising and retail.
Between 2020 and 2023, the number of notified mergers surged to 90 cases. However, the authority
applied remedies in only three of these cases, all of which were approved subject to conditional
measures. These cases — (i) XP Investimentos and Itaú Unibanco (XP/Itaú); (ii) SBF/Centauro and Nike
Brasil (Nike/SBF), (iii) and Bus Serviços and J3 Participações (Bus/J3) - serve as rare examples where
Cade imposed behavioral commitments to address potential anti-competitive concerns. In each of
these cases, Cade and the involved parties signed consent decrees (known in Portuguese as “Acordos
em Controle de Concentrações” or simply ACCs) to address competition issues, typically by restricting
exclusivity arrangements, ensuring fair access to critical resources, and preventing the misuse of
sensitive business information.
Given that remedies were applied in three cases of our research, this limited number allows
45
for a detailed analysis of each one to assess whether the remedies were tailored to address specific
challenges posed by digital markets, or if they were based more on traditional antitrust concerns. By
examining the remedies applied, we can investigate whether they responded to the unique dynamics
of digital platforms, such as data control, network eects, or platform dominance, or whether
they adhered more closely to classic antitrust principles focused on issues like market share and
exclusivity. We also comment on the Catena X that present interesting particularities to understand
dierent approaches that the competition authority has taken.
4.1.1. Itaú/XP
25
The first digital market case in which Cade applied remedies (according to the DEE Report)
involved the merger between XP Investimentos and Itaú Unibanco, two important players in Brazil’s
financial services sector. This was also the first merger analyzed ater a cooperation agreement between
Cade and the Central Bank of Brazil, which allowed for a coordinated review of the transaction.
Itaú Unibanco is one of Brazil’s largest banks, oering a wide range of financial services,
including retail and corporate banking, asset management, and investment products. XP Investimentos,
a major player in Brazil’s investment market, operates as an open platform providing access to
various third-party financial products, disrupting the traditional brokerage model. When Itaú sought
to acquire XP concerns were raised about the potential for reduced competition, particularly with Itaú
potentially using its market power to restrict competitors’ access to critical resources. And while Cade
acknowledged XP’s role as a significant player, the remedies primarily focused on traditional concerns
rather than those specific to digital markets.
The commitment (ACC) included ensuring that Itaú would not unduly influence XP’s operations,
requiring its operational independence to ensure fair access to its platform for third-party financial
providers. Itaú, for its part, agreed not to discriminate against competing platforms when distributing
its investment products and refrained from targeting its own customers to XP. Both companies also
agreed to an external monitoring system to oversee compliance with the conditions, ensuring the
merger would not harm market competition.
Despite the importance of these measures, the remedies did not specifically address digital
dynamics such as data control or network eects.
4.1.2. Nike/SBF
26
The second case involved the acquisition of Nike Brasil by SBF, the parent company of
Centauro, a major player in the Brazilian sports retail market. This deal raised concerns about
potential horizontal and vertical anti-competitive eects, particularly in the retail and online sales
of sporting goods. The merger would bring together SBF’s retail operations with Nike’s distribution
rights in Brazil, creating potential for market foreclosure and the exclusion of competing retailers
from accessing Nike products.
25 Merger nº 08700.004431/2017-16. Applicants: Itaú Unibanco S/A e XP Investimentos S/A.
All the CADE public proceedings mentioned in this article can be consulted at: https://x.gd/KJaW9.
26 Merger n. 08700.000627/2020-37. Applicants: Grupo SBF S.A e Nike do Brasil Comércio e Participações Ltda.
46
RENZETTI, Bruno Polonio; OLIVEIRA, Daniele Eduarda de. Is there a Brazilian experience with
remedies in digital markets? An empirical analysis of decisions by Cade. Revista de Defesa da
Concorrência, Brasília, v. 13, n. 1, p. 36-56, 2025.
https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v13i1.1933
Among the provisions, the ACC established measures to prevent discriminatory practices
against competitors and to protect sensitive information. It also required the separation of the
commercial units of Centauro and Nike Brazil, including restrictions on employee transfers between
the companies and the maintenance of confidentiality agreements. Furthermore, the ACC established
that the information and documents related to the commercial operations of Nike in Brazil would be
kept segregated from Centauro’s databases within SBF’s systems.
While the last condition draws attention, an analysis of the case reveals that by prohibiting
the unification of their databases, the remedy primarily aimed to preserve the competitive integrity of
the market. It does so without directly addressing digital-specific challenges, such as the exploitation
of consumer data for scaling business operations. Instead, the focus is on preventing the misuse of
sensitive business information - such as product inventory details - that could distort competition.
Therefore, the remedies focused on maintaining a level playing field in the retail sector but did not
consider the long-term impact of e-commerce and digital channels on competition.
4.1.3. Bus/J3
27
In the third case, Cade reviewed the merger between Bus Serviços de Agendamento and J3
Participações, both active in Brazil’s online travel agency (OTA) market. The merger raised concerns
about potential market foreclosure, as Bus Serviços held a dominant position in the Global Distribution
System (GDS) market. As in previous cases, Cade imposed remedies through an agreement (ACC),
which required commitments from the merged entity to prevent anti-competitive practices, such as
exclusive agreements with bus operators and the improper sharing of sensitive competitive data.
The primary competition concerns identified by Cade related to the potential for market
foreclosure. The combined entity could direct its aggregated bus content solely to ClickBus, thus
disadvantaging other GDS providers and competing OTAs which could significantly reduce the options
available to competitors and hinder their ability to challenge the market power of the newly formed
entity. Thus, imposed remedies focused on preventing exclusivity arrangements that could restrict
competition in the GDS and OTA markets.
The ACC imposed key remedies, including prohibiting exclusive contracts between the merged
entity and bus operators or competing OTAs, ensuring equal access to Bus Serviços’ GDS platform. It
also required Bus Serviços to notify clients with exclusivity clauses that they were no longer bound
by them and committed the merged entity to non-discriminatory contracting practices. Additionally,
Cade prohibited the use of sensitive information from rival OTAs, and Bus Serviços was required
to implement a competition compliance program to monitor adherence to these commitments.
Third parties were also given the ability to report any potential anti-competitive behavior through a
whistleblower mechanism.
As is readily apparent, these measures focused on improving access to the GDS and preventing
exclusivity, and were not designed to address any specific digital market concern.
27 Merger nº 08700.004426/2020-17. Applicants: Bus Serviços de Agendamento S.A. e J3 Participações Ltda.
47
4.1.4. Catena X
The Catena X case
28
, involving the creation of a joint venture between eleven automotive
companies, was approved by Cade with restrictions, reflecting concerns about potential competitive
impacts. The transaction aimed to establish a collaborative cloud-based data platform to enhance
eciency and innovation in the sector. While the applicants argued that the initiative would benefit the
entire supply chain by increasing transparency and reducing costs, the Brazilian authority identified
risks related to the exchange of competitively sensitive information. As a result, the conditional
approval introduced safeguards to mitigate these risks.
This case is noteworthy, especially because of unilateral imposition of conditions - as it
is not a common practice on Cade’s merger control. However, it also demonstrates the authority’s
vigilance in addressing potential risks arising from digital transactions. The measures adopted — such
as appointing a compliance ocer and implementing tracking sotware — were primarily focused on
monitoring potential antitrust risks rather than actively fostering competition. While digital remedies
can take a behavioural form, they are oten designed to promote interoperability, data access, or
algorithmic transparency, which were not central aspects of Cade’s decision in this case. Instead, the
measures were more aligned with traditional compliance safeguards to prevent collusion.
Despite Cade’s approval of the transaction with restrictions, the companies ultimately chose
to abandon the transaction. This situation highlights a broader challenge regarding enforcement in
the Global South. When authorities impose remedies, especially those that are perceived as overly
burdensome or restrictive, companies may choose to abandon the transaction rather than comply
with the conditions. This reflects the diculty of enforcing antitrust regulations in regions where
companies may be less willing to accept conditions that they view as detrimental to their business
model or operational flexibility. It also underscores the potential limitations of regulatory power in
the Global South, where businesses may prioritize market expansion or flexibility over compliance
with competition rules.
4.2. Anticompetitive Investigations
Turning to the realm of anticompetitive conduct, Cade has also investigated anti-competitive
behavior in digital markets. Despite an increase in scrutiny, many of these proceedings have been
dismissed
29
, which may reveal a gap in eective enforcement, particularly in unilateral conducts.
To analyze the authority’s approach in this area and assess the potential application of
remedies in cases of anticompetitive conduct, we refer to the 2023 study released by DEE. According
to the report, from 1995 to April 30, 2023, Cade initiated 23 investigations related to digital markets. Of
these, 9 were still under investigation, 11 were dismissed, and 3 were archived following the signing of a
Cease-and-Desist Agreement (from Portuguese Termo de Compromisso de Cessação, TCC) (Cade, 2023).
These cases primarily involved exclusivity agreements and abuse of dominant position. Based on this
28 Merger n. 08700.004293/2022-32. Applicants: Basf S.E, BMW Holding BV and others.
29 Cade’s General-Superintendence is the body responsible for conducting investigations of anticompetitive conducts.
It has the power to dismiss investigations in early stages should it consider not to have enough evidence for a more detailed
investigation.
48
RENZETTI, Bruno Polonio; OLIVEIRA, Daniele Eduarda de. Is there a Brazilian experience with
remedies in digital markets? An empirical analysis of decisions by Cade. Revista de Defesa da
Concorrência, Brasília, v. 13, n. 1, p. 36-56, 2025.
https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v13i1.1933
data, it is evident that, to date, there has been no condemnation for anticompetitive conduct in digital
markets - likely reflecting the challenges Cade faces in investigating this space. Indeed, ater reviewing
the sources, no cases of condemnation have been identified since the publication of the report.
Given the relatively large number of relevant investigations, however, an in-depth analysis of
all of them would unnecessarily lengthen the article. Therefore, in parallel with the previous section,
we will examine only those where TCCs were signed - OTAs, iFood/Rappi, and Gympass/TotalPass. We
will assess whether the commitments in these agreements address issues specific to digital markets
or if they align more with traditional antitrust concerns. Additionally, we oer a short comment
on the Brazilian version of the Google Shopping investigation, as well as remarks on two ongoing
investigations: Meta AI and Apple App Store.
4.2.1. Google Shopping
30
The first case we highlight is the Google Shopping case, one of Brazil’s earliest and most
important investigations into anticompetitive conduct by a digital platform. Initiated in 2013, the
case centered on allegations that Google manipulated its search algorithms to favor its own price
comparison service over competing platforms. This self-preferencing behavior, in which a dominant
platform promotes its own services at the expense of competitors, is a classic concern in antitrust
law. However, despite similarities to the European Union’s investigation, which led to a €2.42 billion
fine against Google in 2017 for similar practices, Cade’s response was markedly dierent. While the
European Commission required Google to amend its business practices, Cade ultimately archived the
case in 2019, citing insucient evidence that Google’s conduct harmed competition or consumers in
the local market.
Cade’s instruction reflected the complexity of analyzing conducts of digital platforms,
particularly when it comes to self-preferencing practices. As noted by Santos (2020, p. 296), there
was excessive focus on defining relevant markets, while the discussion of anticompetitive strategies
associated with innovation was less emphasized. Moreover, by concluding that there was insucient
evidence of competitive harm and that Google’s actions constituted a pro-competitive product
improvement, Cade reinforced the idea that product changes benefiting consumers should generally
be seen as positive unless they explicitly harm rivals or block access to essential facilities (Blume;
Bruch, 2023, p. 42)
4.2.2. OTAs
31
The first critical example of a TCC signed due to anticompetitive conduct in a digital market
is the case involving OTAs Booking.com, Decolar.com and Expedia. The investigation centered around
the use of Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) clauses in contracts between OTAs and hotels, which required
hotels to oer the same or better terms to OTAs as they did to other platforms or their own website.
30 Administrative Proceeding n. 08700.009082/2013-03. Claimant: E-Commerce Media Group Informação e Tecnologia
Ltda. Defendant: Google Inc. e Google Brasil Internet Ltda.
31 Administrative Proceeding n. 08700.005679/2016-13. Respondents: Fórum de Operadores Hoteleiros do Brasil (FOHB)/
Expedia do Brasil Agência de Viagens e Turismo Ltda., Decolar.com Ltda. e Booking.com Brasil Serviços de Reserva de Hotéis
Ltda.
49
These clauses were seen as harmful to price competition and potentially creating barriers to entry for
new competitors and Cade signed an agreement with the parties.
The TCC required the removal of “wide” MFN clauses, which restricted hotels from oering
better terms elsewhere, as they were seen as anti-competitive. However, “narrow” MFN clauses,
which only prohibited hotels from oering lower prices on their own websites, were allowed, as Cade
determined they were legitimate to prevent free-riding on OTAs’ investments. While this case addressed
competition concerns, it is important to note that the remedies imposed were not specifically tailored
to digital markets. Rather, the case centered on traditional competition concerns - mainly price parity
and market access - which are common in both digital and non-digital contexts.
4.2.3. iFood/Rappi
32
Another critical example is the iFood/Rappi that following the precedent of the OTAs case,
ended with a TCC. iFood, a dominant player in Brazil’s online food delivery market, faced investigation
ater Rappi filed a complaint alleging that iFood was imposing exclusivity clauses with restaurants,
potentially hindering competitors.
The investigation revealed that the company exclusivity policy with restaurants could have
been preventing the entry of rivals. In response, the General Superintendence (Cade’s investigative
body) imposed a preventive measure on the food delivery app, eectively prohibiting iFood from
entering into new contracts that included exclusivity clauses. Ater a few months, iFood and Cade
settled a TCC.
The TCC included several key provisions, such as prohibiting MFN clauses with other
marketplaces and banning clauses that prevent partners from oering promotions on competing
platforms or mentioning other food delivery services in ads outside of the iFood platform. It also
restricts iFood from entering into contracts that prevent restaurants from working with other
platforms ater the exclusivity period ends, oering incentives to retain delivery business, or providing
individualized volume-based discounts.
One of the most noteworthy aspects of the agreement between iFood and Cade is the
clause concerning the commitment to open APIs. The agreement includes a provision requiring
iFood to maintain certain APIs that provide specific information available to external developers.
This commitment is intended to reduce operational costs for restaurants using multiple online food
delivery marketplaces, facilitating better integration between iFood’s platform and other Point of Sale
(POS) sotware used by restaurants. By making this data available, restaurants can manage their sales
directly through the POS sotware, ensuring a more seamless operation across platforms.
Indeed, while the commitment to open APIs represents a step towards greater integration
and operational eciency for restaurants, it does not fully address the structural issues inherent to
the digital economy, such as the role of network eects in reinforcing iFood’s market position or the
impact of data control in limiting competitors’ ability to oer competing services. In this case, the
API commitment, while beneficial, focuses more on improving operational eciencies for restaurants
32 Administrative Proceeding n. 08700.004588/2020-47. Respondent: iFood.com Agência de Restaurantes Online S.A.
(iFood).
50
RENZETTI, Bruno Polonio; OLIVEIRA, Daniele Eduarda de. Is there a Brazilian experience with
remedies in digital markets? An empirical analysis of decisions by Cade. Revista de Defesa da
Concorrência, Brasília, v. 13, n. 1, p. 36-56, 2025.
https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v13i1.1933
rather than addressing the underlying competitive dynamics in the online food delivery marketplace.
Thus, although the case sought to ensure some level of market access for competing
aggregators, it did not go beyond contractual limitations to implement remedies that could structurally
impact competition in digital fitness platforms. This highlights a recurring challenge in antitrust
enforcement in digital markets - ensuring that commitments are not merely adaptations of traditional
remedies but rather tailored interventions that address the core mechanisms of platform dominance.
4.2.4. Gympass/TotalPass
33
A similar approach was taken in the Gympass/Total Pass case, which involved allegations that
Gympass was using exclusivity clauses to restrict gyms from oering services on competing platforms.
Gympass, which aggregates access to fitness centers, was investigated for imposing exclusivity clauses
that allegedly restricted gyms from oering services on competing platforms. Once again, the case
ended up with an TCC focusing on imposing restrictions to ensure greater competition.
Under the terms of the Agreement, Gympass is required to limit exclusivity clauses with
aliated gyms to no more than 20% of its gym base in any given city or district and being monitored
by a trustee nominated by the signatories and approved by Cade, with a daily fine imposed in case
of non-compliance. Moreover, despite the similarities, the Gympass/TotalPass case did not include
additional measures that signalled a broader eort by the authority to address digital market-specific
concerns - such as the API-sharing commitment seen in the iFood case. In this sense, even the small
progresses towards a more specific approach does not seem consistent. In this regard, e, the decision
in this case also does not address broader issues specific to digital platforms.
4.2.5. Jedi Blue
34
The Jedi Blue case concerned an alleged agreement between Google and Facebook that
allegedly favored Facebook in online advertising auctions in exchange for Facebook’s commitment to
refrain from supporting alternative advertising technologies, therefore horizontal restrictions.
In this case, Cade focused on whether the sharing of sensitive information between the
two companies was intended to artificially raise ad prices by creating the illusion of competition.
Specifically, the agreement between the two technological giants was said to involve preferential
treatment for Facebook in terms of ad fees, placement, and data access, while Facebook would avoid
using a competing programmatic advertising system, header bidding, which could have undermined
Google’s ad revenues.
The case ended up being dismissed by the General-Superintendence a few months ater the
beginning of the investigations. The authority found that the agreement lacked evidence of anti-
competitive eects, noting that it did not impose absolute restrictions on either company’s ability to
develop competing services.
33 Administrative Proceeding n. 08700.004136/2020-65). Interested party: GPBR Participações Ltda. (Gympass).
34 Administrative Proceeding n. 08700.006751/2022-78. Claimant: Cade ex ocio Respondent: Google Inc. and Google
Brasil Internet Ltda.
51
4.2.6. Meta AI
35
The recent probe opened against Meta may oer a unique opportunity for the competition
authority to consider remedies and to work alongside the national data protection authority. The
investigation started via a petition by IDEC – a third-sector NGO focused on consumer protection –
arguing that Meta would be employing public personal data of its users to train it artificial intelligence
tools. According to IDEC, Meta’s conduct would amount to unlawful exercise of market power
(monopolization), with the goals of raising barriers to entry (no other company would have access to
the same amount of data as Meta to train an AI tool) and entrenchment of a dominant position.
A similar petition was submitted to the Brazilian Data Protection Authority (ANPD). As a result,
ANPD issued in July 2024 an interim measure ordering the immediate suspension of Meta’s use of
personal data to train the AI tool, as well as imposing tailored remedies that should be complied
with if Meta wished to resume the use of data
36
. On August 30, 2024, it was announced that Meta had
accepted the conditions to collect, process and use personal data for AI purposes. ANPD continues to
monitor compliance of the remedy.
The investigation at Cade is still ongoing. This case highlights how issues in digital markets may call
dierent regulatory bodies for action. In order for a successful enforcement of anticompetitive conducts –
and the development of suitable remedies – it is of utmost importance for authorities to cooperate.
4.2.7. Apple App Store
The Apple App Store investigation
37
is the Brazilian version of the debacle that started with
Epic Games and Apple in the United States. In the Brazilian version, the company Mercado Livre filed
a complaint with Cade arguing that Apple would be (i) prohibiting the distribution of third-party
digital services, which would be enforced through a ban based in its App Developer Program License
Agreement (ADPLA) and App Store Review Guidelines (the Guidelines), preventing app developers
from oering goods or services on the iOS system that are used outside the developer’s app; and
(ii) an obligation imposed on app developers who sell digital goods or services within their apps to
exclusively use Apple’s own payment processing system.
In November 2024, the General-Superintendence imposed an Interim Measure against Apple.
According to the decision, Apple would have to suspend the application of some parts of its ADPLA and
the Guidelines, allowing developers to (i) inform users about alternative means of payment outside
the app; (ii) show users links and buttons (known as call to action) which allow users to purchase
goods or services without using the in-app payment system; and (iii) contract with alternative means
of in-app payment. The Interim Measure also demanded for the sideloading of app stores on iOS.
Apple was given twenty days to comply with the measures.
Apple appealed to Cade’s Tribunal and also sought relief in the Brazilian courts against the
Interim Measure. The company granted an injunction by a judge suspending the eects of the interim
35 Administrative Proceeding n. 08700.004482/2024-77. Claimant: Instituto Brasileiro de Defesa do Consumidor - IDEC.
Respondent: Meta INC. e Facebook Serviços Online do Brasil Ltda.
36 Proceeding n. 00261.004509/2024-36. Defendant: Meta Platforms Inc. – Facebook Serviços Online do Brasil. Voto n.
11/2024/DIR-MW/CD.
37 Investigation n. 08700.009531/2022-04. Complainant: Ebazar.com.br Ltda and Mercado Pago Instituição de Pagamen-
to Ltda. Defendant: Apple Inc. and Apple Services LATAM LLC.
52
RENZETTI, Bruno Polonio; OLIVEIRA, Daniele Eduarda de. Is there a Brazilian experience with
remedies in digital markets? An empirical analysis of decisions by Cade. Revista de Defesa da
Concorrência, Brasília, v. 13, n. 1, p. 36-56, 2025.
https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v13i1.1933
measure until a final decision was rendered by Cade. More recently, the Federal Court of Appeals
for the 1
st
Region (TRF1) overturned the decision by the judge and reinstated the Interim Measure,
granting Apple ninety days to comply (Peters, 2025). The case is still ongoing.
It is worth noting that given the importance of the matter, Cade organized a Public Consultation
to discuss competitive aspects of mobile digital ecosystems, particularly iOS and Android. The
consultation took place on February 19, 2025, and had the participation of players of the industry,
associations, academics and non-governmental organizations.
4.3. Findings
In summary, the analysis of the cases listed above shows that, despite Cade dealing with both
structural and behavioral cases in digital markets, and notwithstanding its apparent proactivity and
engagement with the issue, the remedies applied have not specifically addressed the unique concerns
of digital markets. The few and rare instances in which the Brazilian authority imposed remedies to
restrict competitive concerns were done through agreements negotiated with the parties involved.
The balance is three ACCs and three TCCs. This could indicate the agency’s reluctance to handle these
emerging markets and its caution in considering the perspectives of the parties involved, avoiding
taking more intrusive position in digital markets.
However, Cade has also dismissed significant cases concerning activities that seemed to fall
within antitrust violations. In this sense, there has yet to be any formal condemnation of digital
platforms in Brazil, highlighting the complexities the agency faces in adapting antitrust enforcement
to the digital economy.
5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The typical remedies applied to competition concerns have not been eective in addressing
the specific challenges of digital markets. The unique characteristics of these markets - such as
network eects, data control, and multi-sided business models - call for more proactive and tailored
regulatory approaches. This means that competition authorities must move beyond traditional tools
and consider more intrusive measures, such as ex ante regulation, to address competitive deficits.
Acknowledging that competition law alone may not possess all the necessary tools to ensure a more
contestable, fair, and democratic market is an important step in advancing regulatory frameworks in
the digital economy.
Nevertheless, this is not an easy task, especially for developing countries, which face significant
challenges in adapting traditional regulatory models to the complexities of digital platforms. These
countries oten struggle with limited resources and weaker institutional capacity to eectively monitor
and regulate fast-evolving digital markets. Additionally, many digital platforms operate on a global
scale, making it dicult for national regulators to enforce rules without international cooperation. As a
result, countries in the Global South must contend with the double burden of regulating emerging digital
sectors while simultaneously addressing existing economic disparities and institutional weaknesses.
In Brazil, the situation is no dierent. The authority has not yet established a comprehensive
framework to deal with the unique challenges of digital platforms. As evidenced in the cases discussed,
Cade’s approach to remedies continue to rely heavily on traditional antitrust tools, which oten fail to
53
capture the full complexities of digital markets. While such tools remain important, they do not address
the underlying issues of data control, network eects, and the platform economy, which are central to
understanding and regulating competition in digital markets. Moreover, there is no pattern of analysis
for digital market investigations. This likely mirrors the situation in other countries of the Global South,
where competition authorities are struggling to adapt traditional models to distinctive features.
While traditional competition law tools may still play a role, Brazil needs to revisit its toolkit
and embrace the fact that the current framework is not sucient to tackle all the concerns that digital
markets pose to the competitive environment. In this sense, we believe that the authority must not
be constrained to well-established remedies in antitrust practice and literature but act boldly by
developing updated remedies more capable of curing the competitive ailment forged by dominant
digital players.
An initial step has been done in Brazil. In October 2024, the Ministry of Economy unveiled a
130-page report in which it outlines its proposals and recommendations to enhance the regulatory
environment applicable to digital platforms in Brazil (Brasil, 2024). The report was led by the Secretariat
for Economic Reforms and is a product of a public consultation opened by the Ministry in the first
months of 2024.
The proposals set forth by the Report are divided in two categories. First, a group of proposals
deemed as a new tool for fostering competing in cases of platforms with “systemic relevance”. This
would entail a legislative change in order to establish in law the criteria for designating platforms as
such. The criteria would be both qualitative and quantitative: it would look at aspects such as market
power associated with strong network eects, the oering of multiple online services, intense use of
personal data and significant number of users; on the quantitative side, the law would establish a
minimum turnover threshold – globally and nationally -for platforms to be designated as “systemic
relevant”. The report stresses the importance of setting a safe harbor for platforms with turnovers
below the threshold. Even though we do not know what the threshold would be, it is expected to be
high enough to capture only the Big Tech firms. Importantly enough, all the designation decisions
must be submitted to Cade.
Second, on the remedy discussion, the Report establishes that Cade would have the power
to impose new substantive obligations to the designated platforms. Such obligations would be
individually tailored to each platform, taking into consideration its business model. Should a platform
fail to comply with the obligations, it would be subject to an in-depth investigation by Cade.
The Report released by the Ministry of Economy is a testimony to the importance given
to competition enforcement in the current Brazilian administration. It is worth noting that Cade
submitted lengthy comments to the Ministry while the report was being crated. In its comments,
Cade acknowledges the need for an updated framework of competition enforcement in the country
to deal with the challenges of digital markets. On the remedies discussion, Cade asserts that it has an
important that track record that should be expanded
38
.
38 “CADE’s robust track record in implementing remedies to restore market competitiveness, including digital ones,
combined with its specialized regulation, is essential for eciently dealing with antitrust issues in this dynamic sector. Central-
izing this competency strengthens the agency’s ability to adapt to the complexities and innovations of digital markets, avoiding
fragmented oversight and ensuring timely and informed interventions” (Cade, 2024b, p. 55).
54
RENZETTI, Bruno Polonio; OLIVEIRA, Daniele Eduarda de. Is there a Brazilian experience with
remedies in digital markets? An empirical analysis of decisions by Cade. Revista de Defesa da
Concorrência, Brasília, v. 13, n. 1, p. 36-56, 2025.
https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v13i1.1933
The Brazilian Competition Act needs to be revisited to be ready to face the continuing
challenge of digital markets. Considering what we found in this paper – that is, the reticent activity
of the authority in developing and imposing specific remedies in digital markets – a possible ex ante
regulation is welcome and will only enhance Brazil as a leading antitrust enforcer in the Global South.
REFERENCES
ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL FOR ECONOMIC DEFENSE (Cade). BRICS in the Digital Economy: Competition
Policy in Practice: 2nd Report by the Competition Authorities Working Group on Digital Economy.
Brasília: Cade, 2024a. Available at: https://x.gd/dVkt2n. Accessed on: 26 Feb. 2025.
ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL FOR ECONOMIC DEFENSE (Cade). CADE’s contribution to the Ministry of
Finance’s Public consultation for regulation of digital platforms. Brasília: Cade, 2024b. Available at:
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