Pricing algorithms and tacit collusion: what is the evidence?

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Published: Dec 14, 2022
DOI: https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v10i2.1014
Keywords:
algorithm; pricing; cartel; competition; concentration algoritmo; fijación de precios; cartel; competencia; concentración algoritmo; precificação; cartel; concorrência; concentração

Main Article Content

Rutelly
Escola Nacional de Administração Pública
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2807-8024
Fernando
Goias Federal University
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9570-8113

Abstract

Introduction: This study aims to identify, from a quick review, if there is evidence that pricing algorithms lead to implicit collusion. This study aims to fill a gap in the Brazilian antitrust literature, which does not have a consolidated view of the state of the art on power of algorithms.


Materials and methods: This research adopts a rapid literature review on pricing algorithms. Eighteen articles dealing with theory, simulation, empirical, and qualitative studies were selected.


Results: From the review, it is concluded that (i) evidence of implicit collusion arising from pricing algorithms is still found at the theoretical level and in simulation models, and (ii) there is a lack of empirical evidence associated with cases of antitrust judged by competition authorities.


Discussion: Considering that it is an incipient topic with rich potential still uncertain, the studies included in the quick review point to the importance of antitrust authorities to prepare for the new competitive scenario formatted by disseminating pricing algorithms. In this article, we explore practical consequences for the Brazilian regulatory authority. The article contributes to policy formulation for the defense of competition based on evidence.

Article Details

Issue
Vol. 10 No. 2 (2022): JULHO/DEZEMBRO 2022
Section
Revista de Defesa da Concorrência
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Author Biographies

Rutelly, Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Consultor Legislativo. Doutorando em Políticas Públicas pela Escola Nacional de Administração Pública (ENAP), Mestre em Economia pelo Centro de Desenvolvimento e Planejamento Regional (Cedeplar) da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) e Bacharel em Ciências Econômicas pela UFMG. É professor colaborador dos cursos de MBA na área de regulação ofertados pela Fundação Getúlio Vargas de Brasília-DF e do MBA em Direito e Regulação do Setor Elétrico do Instituto Brasileiro de Ensino, Desenvolvimento e Pesquisa (IDP). Brasília - DF.

Fernando, Goias Federal University

Professor associado da Faculdade de Ciências Sociais da Universidade Federal de Goiás (UFG). Professor do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Política e Relações Internacionais da UFG. Professor do Programa Profissional de Doutorado em Políticas Públicas da Escola Nacional de Administração Pública (ENAP). Professor afiliado no Ostrom Workshop on Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University. Pesquisador do Instituto Nacional de Ciência e Tecnologia (INCT) – Democracia Digital, Universidade Federal da Bahia (UFBA). Bolsista de Produtividade do Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq). Filgueiras é doutor em Ciência Política pelo Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro (Iuperj). Entre suas obras, Governance for the Digital World - Nem More State Nem More Market (Palgrave, 2021), com Virgilio Almeida. Goiânia-GO.

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