Data-Driven Mergers: A Call for Further Integration of Dynamics Effects into Competition Analysis


  • Andressa Lin Fidelis Georgetown University Law Center


This report reviews data-driven mergers by focusing on two main competition challenges associated with them. Firstly, it analyses whether data-platforms may pose an unreplicable competitive advantage to entrants, and to what extend data-driven indirect network effects may harm competition and innovation. Secondly, it reviews the intersection between competition and privacy, and the quantification of the effects of quality reduction. The report argues that a more dynamic approach can contribute to address those challenges better than a pure static framework, and proposes a re-analysis of the European Commission’s merger decision regarding Facebook/WhatsApp to test whether its outcome would have changed if a more forward-looking analysis were taken into account. The report concludes by summarizing the main takeaways and proposing that dynamic effects, consumer choice, and merger control be analysed more holistically.


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Biografia do Autor

Andressa Lin Fidelis, Georgetown University Law Center

Mestre em Direto (LL.M., Dean’s List) pela Georgetown University Law Center (2014) e bacharel em Direito pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (2010). Membro da Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil, São Paulo. Advogada de direito da concorrência, direito público e regulação e atual assessora no Gabinete da Superintendência-Geral do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE).






Revista de Defesa da Concorrência
Recebido 2017-08-02
Aceito 2017-10-26
Publicado 2017-11-20