The Google paradox: the generation of efficiency gains and anticompetitives conducts

Abstract

Contextualization: The article takes into account the exponential growth of the digital economy and the changes promoted in the dynamics of market functioning and in the relationship between economic agents, notably regarding the implications for competition. The study has as its specific context the recent decisions of the cases involving Google at the Federal Trade Commission, the European Commission and Cade.

Objective: The objective of the article is, in the foreground, to identify whether efficiency gains generated by economic agents are relevant for competitive analysis. In the background, the objective is to verify whether Google produces efficiency gains for the market and whether these eventual gains are able of compensating or mitigating possible anticompetitive conducts practiced.

Method: The deductive method was used to study the literature, including bibliographic reviews produced by Cade, North American and European literature focused on the study of economic efficiencies and national literature that focuses on the peculiarities of digital markets and the Google agent. Content analysis was also used for the quantitative examination of Cade’s jurisprudence and decisions involving Google in Cade, the Federal Trade Commission and the European Commission.

Conclusion: As partial results, it was identified that (i) efficiency gains can be considered in the assessment of anticompetitive conduct in the light of Brazilian competition law and (ii) Google, in the specific cases analyzed by Cade, produced efficiency gains for the Brazilian market, and these gains were, albeit indirectly, considered in the judgment of anticompetitive practices.