Antitrust Leniency Policy: diagnoses, scenarios and an empirical perspective of the Brazilian case
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Abstract
Context: recent diagnoses, carried out by international agencies and researchers, identify a possible decline in the attractiveness of Antitrust Leniency Programs. Determining possible causes is challenging, as there are significant institutional differences between different jurisdictions, and access to detailed data about programs is restricted due to their confidential nature, which makes not only accurate diagnosis difficult, but also design of improvement proposals that adhere to the specificities of each program.
Objective: this paper aims to analyze the results of empirical research, carried out by other researchers and/or international agencies, on Antitrust Leniency Programs, in order to critically evaluate recent diagnoses, as well as present descriptive statistics on the Brazilian Leniency Program.
Method: literature review and and exploratory analysis of descriptive statistics.
Conclusions: diagnoses and scenarios regarding Antitrust Leniency Programs need to be evaluated in light of the institutional specificities of each jurisdiction and, to this end, it is necessary to analyze data not only on the results of the programs, but also on the dynamics of the negotiation process.
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