Evolution of the role of market structure in antitrust analysis and the return of structural presumption: Et tu, Cade?

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Publicado: 2025-12-10
DOI: https://doi.org/10.52896/cn9gna05
Palavras-chave:
reversal of the burden of proof; market structure; structural presumption; merger control; economic evidence.

Conteúdo do artigo principal

Bernardo Gouthier Macedo
LCA Consultoria Econômica – São Paulo/SP, Brasil
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9891-6038
Lucas Portela de Mauro
LCA Consultoria Econômica – São Paulo/SP, Brasil
https://orcid.org/0009-0009-1875-3821
Anna Olimpia de Moura Leite
LCA Consultoria Econômica – New York/NY, EUA
https://orcid.org/0009-0000-6909-2562

Resumo

Context: the increasing relevance of digital platforms has raised concerns about the effectiveness of current antitrust policies in addressing long-term competitive risks.   


Objective: the article aims to analyze the arguments for reintroducing structural presumptions in antitrust analysis, particularly in merger control, and the implications of this approach for the role of economic evidence.   


Method: the study employs a literature review and qualitative analysis of legal and economic arguments related to antitrust enforcement and market structure. It examines the historical evolution of antitrust analysis, from the strict structuralism of the past to the current focus on effects-based evaluations.   


Conclusions: the study concludes that the reintroduction of structural presumptions in antitrust analysis signals a shift towards stricter enforcement and a greater emphasis on preventing potential competitive harm. The study also highlights the importance of balancing structural presumptions with effects-based analysis to foster innovation and protect competition in the digital age.

Detalhes do artigo

Edição

v. 13 n. 2 (2025): Revista de Defesa da Concorrência

Seção

Revista de Defesa da Concorrência
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Biografia do Autor

Bernardo Gouthier Macedo, LCA Consultoria Econômica – São Paulo/SP, Brasil

Mestre e doutor em economia pela Unicamp. Sócio-Diretor da LCA Consultoria Econômica.

Lucas Portela de Mauro, LCA Consultoria Econômica – São Paulo/SP, Brasil

Economista, Diretor na LCA Consultoria Econômica.

Anna Olimpia de Moura Leite, LCA Consultoria Econômica – New York/NY, EUA

Mestre em Economia pela USP e Doutoranda na New School for Social Research. Diretora na LCA Consultoria Econômica.

Como Citar

Evolution of the role of market structure in antitrust analysis and the return of structural presumption:: Et tu, Cade?. Revista de Defesa da Concorrência, Brasília, v. 13, n. 2, 2025. DOI: 10.52896/cn9gna05. Disponível em: https://revista.cade.gov.br/index.php/revistadedefesadaconcorrencia/article/view/1929. Acesso em: 11 dez. 2025.

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