Evolução do papel da estrutura de mercado na análise antitruste e o retorno da presunção estrutural:  structural presumption:álise antitruste e o retorno da presunção estrutural: Et tu, Cade? <i>Et tu</i>, Cade?

Contenido principal del artículo

Bernardo Gouthier Macedo
Lucas Portela de Mauro
Anna Olimpia de Moura Leite

Resumen

Este artículo analiza los argumentos para la reintroducción de presunciones estructurales en el análisis antimonopolio, particularmente en el control de fusiones, y las implicaciones de este enfoque para el papel de la evidencia económica. Examina la evolución histórica del análisis antimonopolio, desde el estricto estructuralismo del pasado hasta el enfoque actual en las evaluaciones basadas en efectos, y la reciente tendencia hacia una aplicación más estricta y un mayor énfasis en la prevención de posibles daños a la competencia. El estudio concluye que la reintroducción de presunciones estructurales en el análisis antimonopolio señala un cambio hacia una aplicación más estricta y un mayor énfasis en la prevención de posibles daños a la competencia, lo que exige un equilibrio entre las presunciones estructurales y el análisis basado en efectos para fomentar la innovación y proteger la competencia.

Detalles del artículo

Sección

Revista de Defesa da Concorrência

Biografía del autor/a

Bernardo Gouthier Macedo, LCA Consultoria Econômica – São Paulo/SP, Brasil

Mestre e doutor em economia pela Unicamp. Sócio-Diretor da LCA Consultoria Econômica.

Lucas Portela de Mauro, LCA Consultoria Econômica – São Paulo/SP, Brasil

Economista, Diretor na LCA Consultoria Econômica.

Anna Olimpia de Moura Leite, LCA Consultoria Econômica – New York/NY, EUA

Mestre em Economia pela USP e Doutoranda na New School for Social Research. Diretora na LCA Consultoria Econômica.

Cómo citar

Evolução do papel da estrutura de mercado na análise antitruste e o retorno da presunção estrutural:  structural presumption:álise antitruste e o retorno da presunção estrutural: Et tu, Cade? Et tu, Cade?. Revista de Defesa da Concorrência, Brasília, v. 13, n. 2, 2025. DOI: 10.52896/cn9gna05. Disponível em: https://revista.cade.gov.br/index.php/revistadedefesadaconcorrencia/article/view/1929. Acesso em: 13 dec. 2025.

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