Innovation concerns in horizontal mergers: empirical evidence from Brazilian Merger Control

Conteúdo do artigo principal

Marcos Puccioni de Oliveira Lyra
Camila Cabral Pires-Alves

Resumo

Objective: this paper investigates how Cade – the Brazilian antitrust authority – has addressed innovation concerns in merger assessments, using antitrust literature and the experiences of the United States and the European Commission as reference points.


Method: review of academic and institutional literature, data collection, and case studies.


Conclusions: although Cade follows the standard approach in its Guidelines used by the US and the European Commission, its experience with innovation concerns remains more limited than these jurisdictions. An innovation-specific assessment was conducted in only one case: Bayer/Monsanto (2018). In most cases, innovation was addressed within the standard analysis, often in an insufficient manner. The findings highlight the need to develop a local approach tailored to the Brazilian context, as much of the current discussion relies on foreign case law. Finally, no significant evolution was observed between 2015 and 2022.

Detalhes do artigo

Seção

III Rio International Workshop on Advances in Competition Policy Analysis

Biografia do Autor

Marcos Puccioni de Oliveira Lyra, Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF)

Doutor em Economia (UFRJ – 2022), Professor Adjunto (Faculdade de Economia - UFF), Pesquisador do Gdec (Grupo de Direito, Economia e Concorrência – UFRJ), Pesquisador do NIETI (Núcleo de Estudos em Economia Industrial, Energia, Território e Inovação – UFF).

Camila Cabral Pires-Alves, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade)

Doutora em Economia (UFRJ – 2010), Conselheira do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa (Cade). Está cedida ao Cade pela UFRJ, onde é Professora Associada (Instituto de Economia – UFRJ) e Pesquisadora do Gdec (Grupo de Direito, Economia e Concorrência – UFRJ).

Como Citar

Innovation concerns in horizontal mergers:: empirical evidence from Brazilian Merger Control. Revista de Defesa da Concorrência, Brasília, v. 13, n. 1, p. p. 95–109, 2025. DOI: 10.52896/rdc.v13i1.1927. Disponível em: https://revista.cade.gov.br/index.php/revistadedefesadaconcorrencia/article/view/1927. Acesso em: 30 jun. 2025.

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