An empirical analysis of antitrust fines in Brazil (2012–2020)
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Background: the antitrust enforcement remains a primary concern for regulatory authorities globally. A central issue within this domain is the determination of appropriate penalties for violators, as antitrust fines serve both to deter future violations and to disrupt ongoing anticompetitive behaviors.
Objective: utilizing a comprehensive, hand-collected database of antitrust cases from 2012 to 2020, this study aims to empirically examine the factors that are associated with the imposition of corporate antitrust fines in Brazil.
Method: econometric estimates based on Ordinary Least Squares and Random-Intercept Model.
Conclusions: the number of subsections within Law No. 12.529/11, the duration of the infringement, the number of corporations involved, and the type of corporation (with traditional companies facing higher fines) are all positively associated with the severity of fines. Additionally, the scope of the market at international and national levels also demonstrates a statistically significant positive relationship with the fines imposed. Cases involving the fuel sector are also associated with higher penalties, suggesting the presence of sector-specific enforcement patterns. The findings of this study provide valuable insights for both Brazilian policymakers and global stakeholders, contributing to the enhancement of deterrence mechanisms by amplifying the perceived costs of anticompetitive conduct.
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